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CREATING AN AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW: 
ALIENABILITY AND ITS LIMITS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
Claire Priest* 
This article analyzes an issue central to the economic and political development of the 
early United States: laws protecting real property from the claims of creditors. 
Traditional English law, protecting inheritance, shielded a debtor's land from the reach 
of creditors in two respects. An individual's freehold interest in land was exempted from 
the claims of unsecured creditors both during life and in inheritance proceedings. In 
addition, even when land had been explicitly pledged as collateral in mortgage 
agreements, chancery court procedures imposed substantial costs on creditors using legal 
process to seize the land. American property law, however, emerged in the context of 
colonialism and the dynamics of the Atlantic economy. In 1732, to advance the 
economic interests of English merchants, Parliament enacted a sweeping statute, the Act 
for the More Easy Recovery of Debts in His Majesty's Plantations and Colonies in 
America, which required that real property, houses, and slaves be treated as legally 
equivalent to chattel property for the purpose of satisfying debts in all of the British 
colonies in America and the West Indies. This statute substantially dismantled the legal 
framework of the English inheritance system by giving unsecured creditors priority to a 
deceased's land over heirs. The Act also required that the courts hold auctions to sell 
both slaves and real property to satisfy debts in most colonies. More broadly, this legal 
transformation likely led to greater commodification of real property, the expansion of 
slavery, and more capital for economic development. American landholders, however, 
were subjected to greater financial risk than would have been the case in the absence of 
the Act. 
The Act for the More Easy Recovery of Debts was reenacted by most, but not all, state 
legislatures in the founding era. One legacy of the colonial era was that, through the 
1840s, most states exempted only minimal amounts of property from creditors' claims. 
Tensions relating to creditors' remedies, both between the states and the federal 
government and between states with differing policies, had important consequences for 
American federalism. The history of creditors' claims to real property in the colonial 
and founding periods is important to understanding the emergence of an American 
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property law, the economic development of the colonies and states, the expansion of 
slavery, and American federalism. 
Introduction 
Joseph 
Story, writing about American legal development in his Com- 
mentaries on the Constitution, described a transformation in colonial 
property law, the effect of which was to "make land, in some degree, a 
substitute for money, by giving it all the facilities of transfer, and all 
the prompt applicability of personal property."1 
The legal treatment of land as a substitute for money - the most 
fungible of all assets - had important economic and political implica- 
tions in the context of the Anglo-American property tradition. It sug- 
gests that, in America, land was treated as a commodity without spe- 
cial status. The description of land as having the "facilities of transfer" 
and "prompt applicability" of chattel property suggests that few legal 
and procedural hurdles impeded the use of land in market exchanges, 
and therefore that land was potentially available for full economic use. 
Story's comment also implies that America had departed from the 
traditional English law of real property which treated land as the 
source of wealth of families that, like an endowment, would persist 
through the generations. English law reflected a society in which po- 
litical and social authority was vested in a landed class that perpetu- 
ated itself through long-term ownership of real property. Blackstone's 
Commentaries of the late eighteenth century described "the principal 
object of the laws of real property in England" as the law of inheri- 
tance.2 Americans from the founding era forward, however, viewed 
the greater circulation of land in America as the basis of a new politi- 
cal ideal - republicanism - that offered more opportunity for politi- 
cal participation than existed in European society. As Noah Webster 
stated in 1787, for example, "[a]n equality of property, with a necessity 
of alienation, constantly operating to destroy combinations of powerful 
families, is the very soul of a republic"3 
TVaditional English laws and procedures stabilized the inheritance 
system of the English landed class by protecting real property from the 
claims of creditors in multiple ways. The law incorporated a default 
1 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 
§ 182 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833). 
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2oi; see also A.W.B. Simpson, Land Own- 
ership and Economic Freedom, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 13, 19 (Harry N. 
Scheiber ed., 1998) ("The aim was to pass the complete estate as a unit down the family line, ide- 
ally to a succession of males. . . . Thus the family land was employed as a patrimony for the whole 
family, in which individuals performed istinct roles."). 
3 Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Fed- 
eral Constitution 47 (Phila., Prichard & Hall 1787). 
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rule that protected property owners' titles to land from the claims of 
all unsecured creditors - that is, claims to collect debts when land 
had not been explicitly offered as security.4 The law also extended this 
rule so that, at the death of a debtor, the debtor's real property hold- 
ings descended to the heirs and devisees free of all legal claims of the 
deceased debtor's unsecured creditors. As Sir Samuel Romilly de- 
scribed, an English landowner was "allowed to live in splendour on his 
property, while his honest creditors remain[ed] unpaid, struggling per- 
haps with all the vicissitudes of trade, or reduced to bankruptcy and 
ruin."5 
Under English law, landowners could alienate freehold interests in 
land by satisfying the formalities of secured credit agreements such as 
mortgages, bonds, deeds, or wills - formalities not undertaken for un- 
secured debt. Creditors seeking to force the seizure of land pledged in 
secured credit agreements, however, suffered the procedural costs of 
having to obtain a judgment in a common law court and a foreclosure 
decree in the Court of Chancery. Moreover, the Court of Chancery 
gave landed inheritance preferential treatment over debt satisfaction in 
its proceedings. 
The legal restrictions on creditors' ability to seize land in satisfac- 
tion of debts helped to stabilize the landed class by protecting real 
property holdings from the risk associated with accumulated unse- 
cured debt. This legal structure, however, on the margin, was likely to 
have reduced capital available for productive investment. The exemp- 
tion of title interests in land from creditors' claims meant that all un- 
secured creditors assumed the risk that debtors (landowners or not) 
might convert their chattel assets and purchase land that creditors 
could not seize. Similarly, unsecured creditors faced the risk that 
landowning debtors might die unexpectedly, in which case their only 
legal recourse would be to seize the debtors' chattel property. Each of 
these risks would have worsened the terms on which creditors would 
lend to debtors on an unsecured basis. The extension of credit with 
security - the promise of the borrower to allow a levy against land - 
was likely to have been limited on the margin by the costs imposed on 
creditors in the form of arduous foreclosure procedures in the Court of 
Chancery. This structure of property rules suggests that, in England, 
greater stability in real property ownership over the generations was 
valued more highly than the more extensive credit and investment in 
economic growth that would have resulted from less restrictive land 
credit policies and the reform of Chancery. 
4 For a discussion of English remedies, see infra section I. A, pp. 401-03. 
5 Samuel Romilly, Freehold Estates Bill (Feb. 7, 181 6), in 2 THE SPEECHES OF SIR 
Samuel Romilly in the House of Commons 74, 75 (William Peter ed., London, James 
Ridgway & Sons 1820). 
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As this Article shows, the status of the American colonies as colo- 
nies in the British Empire, distinguishable socially and politically from 
England, and the desire among English creditors and colonial subjects 
to improve credit conditions in the Empire led to the removal 
throughout the colonies of traditional English protections to land from 
creditors. Initially, most colonial courts and legislatures administered 
the English body of laws exempting real property from the claims of 
creditors. In the late seventeenth century, however, a number of colo- 
nial legislatures in New England and the legislature of Barbados at- 
tempted to expand the extent of credit offered within their colonies by 
rejecting English protections to real property from creditors. Then, 
during a recession in the early 1730s, English merchants and creditors 
became increasingly active in lobbying the English Board of Trade and 
Parliament to monitor and to overturn colonial legislation that they 
viewed as imposing costs on them. In 1731, a group of English credi- 
tors concerned about debt collection in colonies that had relied on 
English credit to expand slave labor forces petitioned Parliament to 
enact a law that would ensure that colonial subjects could not use tra- 
ditional English real property exemptions to protect their land and 
slaves from English creditors. 
In 1732, Parliament enacted a statute entitled the Act for the More 
Easy Recovery of Debts in His Majesty's Plantations and Colonies in 
America6 ("Debt Recovery Act"). The Debt Recovery Act applied to 
all of the North American and West Indian British colonies. It re- 
quired that all interests in real property and slaves be treated exactly 
like personal or chattel property for the purposes of satisfying debts. 
The Debt Recovery Act had both substantive and procedural implica- 
tions. Substantively, the Act abolished the legal distinctions between 
real property, chattel property, and slaves in relation to the claims of 
creditors. Under the Act, land and slaves could be seized and sold to 
satisfy any type of debt, including many widely used forms of unse- 
cured debt.7 In most colonies, executors appointed to distribute the as- 
sets of estates were given the authority to sell real property to pay the 
debts of the deceased, an authority not available under English law. 
In all colonies in America after 1732, in contrast to the English regime, 
an heir to real property took only the land that remained after the 
claims of all of the deceased's creditors had been satisfied. 
Procedurally, the Act required courts to extend to real property and 
to slave property the local processes in place for seizing and selling 
6 5 Geo. 2, c. 7 (1732) (Eng.). 
7 The most widely used forms of unsecured debt in the eighteenth century were book ac- 
counts (similar to tabs), bills of exchange, and promissory notes (similar to checks). See Claire 
Priest, Currency Policies and Legal Development in Colonial New England, no YALE L.J. 1303, 
1328-32 (2001). 
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debtors' chattel property in satisfaction of debts. These processes 
typically consisted of auctions and, at times, of in-kind transfers to 
creditors. The Debt Recovery Act therefore provided parliamentary 
authority for the legal institutionalization of judicially supervised real 
property auctions, a remedy not available to creditors under English 
law. Moreover, as recognized later by English abolitionists, Parlia- 
ment's Debt Recovery Act required that colonial courts engage in one 
of the most abhorrent features of slavery, the administration of slave 
auctions to satisfy judgments based on debts.8 
Moreover, in most colonies, debtors' equity rights to redeem real 
property after a mortgagee had obtained a legal judgment on a mort- 
gage were either strongly curtailed or abolished. The Debt Recovery 
Act required that courts sell land, houses, and slaves to satisfy debts 
according to the same procedures used for chattel property. Often this 
was interpreted as requiring land to be sold during the process of exe- 
cution at law, with the purchaser obtaining a fee simple title interest, 
free of familial redemption rights. In sum, the Act removed protec- 
tions to real property that had increased stability in landownership 
and had safeguarded inheritance, and it came close to abolishing the 
age-old distinctions between real and chattel property. 
Joseph Story stated that "the growth of the respective colonies was 
in no small degree affected by" this legal transformation.9 The trans- 
formation was socially and politically significant as well. English po- 
litical life was dominated by the landed elite whose wealth (in land) 
enjoyed protections from commercial and financial risks. The landed 
class was distinguished from the class of merchants and traders whose 
wealth was subject to those risks.10 In America, the treatment of land 
as legally equivalent to any other form of chattel in relation to credi- 
tors' claims obliterated the division between landed wealth and com- 
mercial wealth, and thus between landowners and merchants. In 
America, prior to the 1840s, all forms of wealth were subject to the 
commercial risks incurred by the property owner, with the exceptions 
of land that was entailed during the colonial period and land that was 
covered by a widow's limited dower interest.11 
Remarkably, no historian to date has thoroughly examined the 
Debt Recovery Act or American colonial laws relating to the use of 
real property as security for debts. Some economic historians have 
briefly noted the importance of creditors' remedies to the rise of slav- 
8 See infra notes 210-212 and accompanying text. 
9 1 STORY, supra note 1, § 182. 
10 The best description of the contrasting characterizations of merchants and the landed elite 
in England is Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of 
the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1986). 
11 See infra pp. 436-37- 
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ery in the West Indies: Jacob M. Price and Russell R. Menard have 
contrasted the "Anglo-Saxon or creditor defense model" of legal reme- 
dies against the land with the "Latin model" used in Brazil where, un- 
der Portuguese rule, landed estates were protected from creditors' 
claims.12 Menard attributes the rise of centralized plantation slavery 
in Barbados, but not in Brazil, to this distinction.13 But these schol- 
ars' analyses are limited to a comparison of slavery in those two colo- 
nies. Scholars of United States history, however, have overlooked the 
issue, aside from very brief references to the potential importance of 
property exemption laws to the colonial economy and to the legal his- 
tory of bankruptcy.14 
12 Jacob M. Price, Credit in the Slave Trade and Plantation Economies, in SLAVERY AND 
THE RISE OF THE ATLANTIC SYSTEM 293, 296, 298 (Barbara L. Solow ed., 1991) (internal quo- 
tation marks omitted); see also Russell R. Menard, Law, Credit, the Supply of Labour, and the Or- 
ganization of Sugar Production in the Colonial Greater Caribbean: A Comparison of Brazil and 
Barbados in the Seventeenth Century, in THE EARLY MODERN ATLANTIC ECONOMY 154, 161 
(John J. McCusker & Kenneth Morgan eds., 2000). 
13 See Menard, supra note 12, at 161; see also RICHARD B. SHERIDAN, SUGAR AND 
SLAVERY, 288-90 (1994) (describing briefly the Debt Recovery Act in the context of the slave 
trade in the West Indies). 
14 See John M. Hemphill, II, Virginia and the English Commercial System, 
1689-1733, at 180-89 (Garland Publ'g, Inc. 1985) (1964) (examining the legislative history of the 
Debt Recovery Act and its importance as a political issue in Virginia); 1 STORY, supra note 1, 
§ 182 (noting a "strong tendency of the colonies to make lands liable to the payment of debts" and 
citing the Debt Recovery Act); Philip Girard, Land Law, Liberalism, and the Agrarian Ideal: Brit- 
ish North America, 17 50-1920, in DESPOTIC DOMINION 120, 121 (John McLaren, A.R. Buck & 
Nancy E. Wright eds., 2005) (mentioning the Act briefly, but emphasizing aspects of property law 
that continued to impede alienation in the nineteenth century - principally dower and condi- 
tional estates); David Thomas Konig, The Virgin and the Virgin's Sister: Virginia, Massachusetts, 
and the Contested Legacy of Colonial Law, in THE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN MASSACHU- 
SETTS 81, 97-98 (Russell K. Osgood ed., 1992) (discussing the Debt Recovery Act briefly). The 
only systematic examinations of this Article's topic in the historical or legal literature are brief 
discussions in 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 425-31 (New York, O. 
Halsted 1830), and Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Enforcement of Money Judgments in Early American 
History, 71 MICH. L. REV. 691 (1973). Riesenfeld 's article is written as a treatise and lists the 
statutory law on remedies. Historians of bankruptcy law have emphasized that property exemp- 
tions were a central issue in debates over federal bankruptcy legislation in the founding era but 
have not systematically examined the law in each of the states. See BRUCE H. MANN, REPUB- 
LIC of Debtors 209-20 (2002); Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States His- 
tory 12-21 (1935); G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 242-46 (2OOO); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1 780-1860, at 131 (1977) (locating property law reforms in the early nine- 
teenth century); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 41-43, 
147-54 (1975) (describing state of debtor-creditor law in Massachusetts before and after the 
American Revolution). GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY (1997), is a 
comprehensive account of the theoretical debates relating to the conceptualization of real property 
in American history. Alexander's work, however, focuses almost exclusively on theoretical per- 
spectives and does not address particular doctrines, such as those relating to the availability of 
land to satisfy creditors' claims. 
Some legal historians of Canada and Australia have recognized the local impact of the Debt 
Recovery Act or similar reforms there. See, e.g., JOHN C. WEAVER, THE GREAT LAND RUSH 
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Of course, scholars of property law and of American history have 
acknowledged the transformation of American property law from its 
English roots. Current scholarship provides two general explanations 
of that transformation. Each of these explanations is important but, 
by overlooking the legal history of the role of land in commercial 
transactions, has missed an essential feature of the history of American 
property law. 
The first explanation derives from the prevailing account of the de- 
cline of feudalism and the rise of alienability of the fee simple interest. 
According to this explanation, the Anglo-American system of private 
property emerged from a restrictive feudal regime in which possessory 
interests in real property were directly tied to the performance of mili- 
tary and other services, and alienation of land was prohibited to safe- 
guard the performance of those services. The emergence of the mod- 
ern system of private property is thus often described as a steady 
march toward free alienability, with the fetters of feudalism removed 
slowly over the centuries. 
There are many proponents of this view. In the late nineteenth 
century, Sir Henry Maine famously stated that "the movement of the 
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to 
Contract"15 Patrick Atiyah has added that, "to a considerable degree, 
freedom of contract began by being freedom to deal with property by 
contract."16 More recently, Robert Ellickson has concluded that 
"[m]odernity . . . fosters alienability. ... As groups modernize, they 
therefore tend not only to lengthen their standard time-spans of land 
ownership, but also to relax traditional restrictions on transfer."17 This 
historical account of the rise of alienation is taught in law school class- 
rooms today. Modern property casebooks provide an account of the 
progressive removal of restraints on the free transfer of property and 
place great emphasis on the emergence of the freely alienable fee sim- 
ple estate as the paradigmatic form of land tenure.18 
and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900, at 244-50 (2003) (discussing mort- 
gage law reform in British colonies); Girard, supra, at 121; John C. Weaver, While Equity Slum- 
bered: Creditor Advantage, a Capitalist Land Market, and Upper Canada's Missing Court, 28 
OSGOODE HALL LJ. 871 (1990) (describing lack of equity courts in Upper Canada as related to 
desire among elites to institute a body of remedial law against land without the redemption rights 
recognized in equity courts). 
15 Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law 170 (TVansaction Publishers 2002) (3d ed. 1866). 
16 RS. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 85 (1979). 
17 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE LJ. 13 15, 1376-77 (1993). 
18 See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 197-220 (5th ed. 2002). 
Dukeminier and Krier emphasize that "[b]y the end of the thirteenth century ... the fee was freely 
alienable." Id. at 210. 
This explanation can be extended to suggest the impact of market development and indus- 
trialization on property. With the emergence of banking and a stock market in the early nine- 
teenth century, individuals began to hold wealth in forms other than real property, such as stocks, 
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This explanation, which might be referred to as the "decline of feu- 
dalism" or "status to contract" theory, is not totally satisfying, however, 
because of its exclusive focus on individuals ' ability to sell fee simple 
interests in land markets. Historically, a more common form of alien- 
ation - or potential alienation - involved property owners offering 
their property as security for loans. Using real property as security for 
debts is a way in which landholders can access resources such as tools, 
livestock, and building materials in agricultural societies, or money in 
more advanced markets. These resources enable landowners to in- 
crease the productivity of their property or to invest in other produc- 
tivity-enhancing activities not related to the land. Land is an ideal 
form of collateral because it cannot be moved or hidden from credi- 
tors. In terms of its role in economic development, the ability to secure 
debts with land is likely to be even more significant than the ability to 
voluntarily sell land in the market.19 This account is a first step to- 
ward a broader narrative that would place the desire for credit at the 
forefront of the historiography of property law. 
Moreover, the history of property doctrines relating to credit sug- 
gests that depictions of a steady march toward alienability and moder- 
nity are inaccurate. As this account shows, the Debt Recovery Act re- 
bonds, and bank accounts. As markets developed and labor became more specialized, labor con- 
tracts became the principal substitute for land tenancy. For works discussing the relation between 
land and industrialization, see ATIYAH, supra note 16; i WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, THE 
Growth of English Industry and Commerce 462-66 (5th ed. 1910); Horwitz, supra 
note 14; James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nine- 
teenth-Century UNITED STATES (1956). For accounts of changes in the laws of property 
and contract over the eighteenth through early twentieth centuries, see Rowland Berthoff, Inde- 
pendence and Attachment, Virtue and Interest: From Republican Citizen to Free Enterpriser, 
1787-1837, in UPROOTED AMERICANS 97 (Richard L. Bushman et al. eds., 1979); Charles W. 
McCurdy, The "Liberty of Contract" Regime in American Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM 
OF CONTRACT, supra note 2, at 161; and John V. Orth, Contract and the Common Law, in THE 
State and Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 44. See also Charles W. McCurdy, 
The Anti-Rent Era in New York Law and Politics, 1839-1865 (2001) (describing per- 
sistence of feudal landholding practices in New York). 
19 One recent study of relatively primitive economies estimates that barriers to secured trans- 
actions have led to economic losses in Argentina and Bolivia amounting to between five and ten 
percent of their respective gross national products. See Heywood Fleisig, Secured Transactions: 
The Power of Collateral, 33 Fin. & Dev. 44, 44 (1996); see also GERSHON Feder ET AL., LAND 
Policies and Farm Productivity in Thailand 109-32, 137-47 (1988) (noting that legally 
titled farmers had better access to credit, improved their lands more, and produced more than 
squatters); WORLD BANK, BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS: WORLD DEVELOP- 
MENT Report 2002, at 93 (2002), available at http://www.w0rldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/ 
fulltext2002.htm (citing Fleisig, supra, in discussing the negative economic impact of barriers to 
secured transactions); Mehnaz Safavian, Heywood Fleisig & Jevgenijs Steinbuks, Unlocking Dead 
Capital, PUB. Pol'y FOR PRIVATE SECTOR (World Bank Group, Washington, D.C.), 
Mar. 29, 2006, available at http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/3o7 S favian_ 
Fleisig_Steinbuks.pdf (noting that reforming collateral law in Albania and Romania led to 
a reduction of the interest rate in secured transactions by five percent and twenty percent 
respectively). 
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fleeted the unique context of British colonialism and imperial rule: the 
Act applied only to the colonies and not to England. In addition, Par- 
liament enacted the Act primarily to quell the concerns of merchants 
lending to colonies for slave purchases, a controversial move toward 
"modernity." One hundred years after the Debt Recovery Act and af- 
ter substantial economic growth, most state legislatures reversed their 
policies and enacted homestead legislation allowing debtors to exempt 
real property or monetary amounts from creditors' claims. The home- 
stead exemption movement was a legal development that reflected a 
desire to secure the stability of land ownership and reduce landowners' 
financial risk, returning to a legal regime more closely resembling that 
of early modern England. The connection between debtor-creditor law 
and modernity is therefore complex. 
A second explanation of the transformation of the law of property 
and inheritance gives emphasis to the American Revolution and the 
belief that vestiges of feudalism - in particular, primogeniture and the 
entail - were incompatible with a republican form of government.20 
Scholars have emphasized that, in the seventeenth century, Puritans 
and other religious dissidents established societies based on far more 
egalitarian and democratic principles than those prevailing in Eng- 
land, with some colonies abolishing primogeniture. During the found- 
ing era, republican principles were adopted with an even greater inten- 
sity and on a more widespread basis. Political leaders such as Thomas 
Jefferson advocated dismantling some remnants of aristocracy by 
adopting policies that would lead to the dispersion of property.21 The 
doctrines of primogeniture and the entail were abolished in all states 
by 1800.22 Alexis de Tocqueville later identified the abolition of pri- 
20 The principal works on the significance of property and inheritance law to founding-era 
political, social, and economic life are ALEXANDER, supra note 14, at 26-88; GORDON S. 
Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 182-84 (1992); Holly Brewer, 
Entailing Aristocracy in Colonial Virginia: "Ancient Feudal Restraints" and Revolutionary Re- 
form, 54 Wm. & MARY Q. 307 (1997); Richard L. Bushman, "This New Man": Dependence and 
Independence, 1776, in UPROOTED AMERICANS, supra note 18, at 77; Stanley N. Katz, Republi- 
canism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1 
(1977) [hereinafter Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance^ Stanley N. Katz, Thomas 
Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467 (1976); David 
Thomas Konig, Jurisprudence and Social Policy in the New Republic, in DEVISING LIBERTY 
178, 188-96 (David Thomas Konig ed., 1995); John V. Orth, After the Revolution: "Reform" of the 
Law of Inheritance, 10 LAW & HIST. REV. 33 (1992). Jedediah Purdy has recently asserted that 
there are republican underpinnings to the American transformation of the property doctrine of 
waste. Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist Interpreta- 
tion, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 653, 681-89 (2006). 
21 See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 137 (William 
Peden ed., W.W. Norton 1954) (1787); NOAH WEBSTER, On the Education of Youth in America, 
in A Collection of Essays and Fugitiv Writings on Moral, Historical, Politi- 
cal, AND LITERARY SUBJECTS i, 24 (Boston, I. Thomas & E.T. Andrews 1790). 
22 See sources cited infra note 249. 
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mogeniture and the entail and the dispersed nature of American prop- 
erty as central features of American democracy.23 In The Radicalism 
of the American Revolution, Gordon S. Wood describes the demise of 
the freehold requirement for the franchise and the treatment of land as 
a commodity as further extensions of revolutionary values, and asserts 
that "the entire Revolution could be summed up by the radical trans- 
formation Americans made in their understanding of property."24 
Thus, this explanation - which I call the republicanism interpretation 
- describes the transformation of the conception of property in Amer- 
ica as a consequence of the ideological opposition to the English aris- 
tocratic political regime. 
But the republicanism interpretation also suffers limitations. 
Again, scholarship in this tradition has emphasized the abolition of 
primogeniture and the entail after the Revolution. The Revolution 
may have made concrete and extended the idea of the free alienability 
of land. But by making land legally equivalent to chattel property for 
purposes of debt collection in all British colonies in America, Parlia- 
ment pushed colonial society away from the model of the English aris- 
tocracy in 1732. Thus, decades before the Revolution, English inheri- 
tance law was partially repealed at the instigation of the English, and 
not as the consequence of the ideological opposition to English political 
and social life. The fact that it was the English who helped to disman- 
tle in the colonies the inheritance system against which the Americans 
are said to have revolted suggests the need for a revision of the repub- 
licanism interpretation. 
This account does not suggest that the abolition of the entail and 
primogeniture in the founding era were not highly important events. 
Even after the enactment of the Debt Recovery Act and of colonial 
laws treating land as legally equivalent to chattel property, colonial 
landowners could protect their property from creditors by entailing it 
or by a settlement process according to which the present possessor 
held only a life interest. This account reveals, however, that in the 
colonies by 1732 entailed lands had become islands removed from 
commerce in a world that otherwise treated land like chattel. Regret- 
tably, to date there has been no conclusive study of the practice of en- 
23 See 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 47-50 (Harvey C. Mans- 
field & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. Chi. Press 2000) (1835). James Kent has also ob- 
served: 
Entailments are recommended in monarchical governments, as a protection to the power 
and influence of the landed aristocracy; but such a policy has no application to republi- 
can establishments, where wealth does not form a permanent distinction, and under 
which every individual of every family has his equal rights, and is equally invited, by 
the genius of the institutions, to depend upon his own merit and exertions. 
4 KENT, supra note 14, at 20. 
24 WOOD, supra note 20, at 269. 
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tailing property in the colonies.25 The reform of property law de- 
scribed here, achieved by the 1730s, however, likely had more wide- 
spread and significant effects on inheritance practices than the aboli- 
tion of primogeniture and the entail after the Revolution. And, again, 
it is remarkable that with respect to creditors' claims, decades before 
the American Revolution, colonial property law treated real property 
as a commodity or, as Story later suggested, as a "substitute for 
money," rather than primarily as a mainstay of social and political sta- 
bility deserving special protection. 
Moreover, scholars of the founding era have overlooked the fact 
that whether land would be available to satisfy debts was an impor- 
tant and divisive issue throughout the period. Federalist commenta- 
tors praised the principles of the Debt Recovery Act as an important 
barrier against aristocracy.26 Thomas Jefferson's writings, in contrast, 
suggest that he was more closely aligned with conservatives who be- 
lieved that traditional English protections to real property and inheri- 
tance were necessary to the creation of a truly "independent" popula- 
tion qualified to participate fully in a democracy.27 To date, no scholar 
has described this feature of Jeff erson 's republican theory in detail. 
Creditors' remedies became an important issue underlying Ameri- 
can federalism in the founding era. One important legacy of the Debt 
Recovery Act was to provide the legal backdrop against which the 
state and federal governments negotiated a balance of power. As an 
example, when debtors experienced the full impact of the Act during 
recessions - the possible loss of their freehold land and disenfran- 
25 Until recently, most historians accepted the work of C. Ray Keim, who empirically studied 
wills in Virginia and found that only a small percent of wills entailed land. See C. Ray Keim, 
Primogeniture and Entail in Colonial Virginia, 25 Wm. & MARY Q. 545, 557-61 (1968). Keim 
concludes that entail "was not a general custom" among small property holders and only in the 
Tidewater region did the practice have "somewhat general use." Id. at 561; see also Bernard 
Bailyn, Politics and Social Structure in Virginia, in SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 90, 
108-12 (James Morton Smith ed., 1959) (concluding that in colonial Virginia "[a] mobile labor 
force free from legal entanglements and a rapid turnover of lands, not a permanent hereditary 
estate, were prerequisites of family prosperity"). Holly Brewer, however, has recently observed 
that Keim's methodology is flawed because, once entailed, land remained entailed through succes- 
sive generations without the need for a subsequent will. Brewer estimates that a much greater 
percentage of land in Virginia was entailed. See Brewer, supra note 20, at 311, 315-16. In my 
view, Brewer's important article, rather than being conclusive, is an invitation for a more precise 
study of the entail using land records, maps, and wills. Without linking wills to land, it is not 
possible to know whether a specific parcel of entailed land appeared in more than one will. 
26 See, e.g., Daniel Webster, Speech at the Massachusetts Convention of 1820-182 1 (Dec. 15, 
1820), in Democracy, Liberty, and Property: The State Constitutional Conven- 
tions OF THE 1820'S 91, 98-99 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1966); DANIEL WEBSTER, A DIS- 
COURSE, Delivered at Plymouth, December 22, 1820, in Commemoration of the 
First Settlement of New-England 95 (Boston, Wells & Lilly 182 1) [hereinafter 
Webster, Plymouth Discourse]. 
-' See infra pp. 450-51. For Jefferson's views on federal bankruptcy legislation according to 
which a bankrupt's lands would be seized and sold, see infra p. 453. 
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chisement - state legislatures responded with temporary debt relief 
legislation that conflicted with the Act's regime. Fear of the conse- 
quences of such democratically enacted policies was one of the reasons 
for including the Contracts Clause in the United States Constitution, 
as a means for the federal courts to regulate state legislatures' debt re- 
lief measures. Moreover, the states held contrasting conceptions of the 
appropriate procedural protections to real property ownership and in- 
heritance, which led to limited consensus for uniform federal policies 
in areas related to debt collection. The Virginian opposition to laws 
making land available to satisfy all debts was the basis for a broader 
opposition to federal government policies that would supersede state 
law. Tensions over the issue of property exemptions, for example, were 
powerful enough to defeat the first attempts at a national bankruptcy 
bill that would have taken the debtor's land for the benefit of credi- 
tors.28 In sum, the history of the Debt Recovery Act and its legacy is 
important to an understanding of federalism in founding-era America. 
Part I of this Article describes the substantive and procedural pro- 
tections to families' long-term title interests in land from seizure by 
creditors in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the 
period relevant to the laws of colonial America. Part II describes the 
transformation of English property law relating to creditors' claims in 
the American colonial period. It examines how English protections to 
real property were transplanted and administered in many colonies. 
Part II then analyzes the adoption of the Debt Recovery Act, its con- 
nection to the expansion of slave imports financed with English credit, 
and the legal transformation throughout the colonies that resulted 
from the Act's adoption. In addition, it describes how English au- 
thorities later depicted the Debt Recovery Act as an important prece- 
dent for the Stamp Act and as an example of how parliamentary over- 
sight of colonial legislation was essential to the rapid economic growth 
of the colonies. 
Part III describes the extension of the principles of the Debt Recov- 
ery Act in the founding era. Most state legislatures reenacted the Debt 
Recovery Act after the Revolution in order to expand the amount of 
credit extended within their states, and courts typically adhered to the 
principles of the Act in the voluminous litigation over credit and in- 
heritance matters emerging after the Revolution. Part III also de- 
scribes the opposition to the founding era legislation that extended the 
Act that appears in state debt relief legislation, in state court decisions, 
in Jefferson's writings, and in national policies. 
28 See MANN, supra note 14, at 209-20. Indeed, our current federal bankruptcy code still per- 
mits those who declare bankruptcy to invoke favorable state property exemption laws, again a 
characteristic of the English post-feudal tradition. 
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The Article concludes by analyzing the broader importance of the 
history of creditors' claims to land and slaves in the colonial and 
founding periods. For over a century, from the late seventeenth cen- 
tury in New England and the enactment of the Debt Recovery Act in 
1732 in many other colonies, through the 1840s, America experienced a 
unique period in which the desire for more extensive credit led to laws 
that provided relatively few protections to real property from credi- 
tors' claims. The two most important consequences of the Act were, 
first, its role in prioritizing commercial interests over the inheritance of 
land and, second, its role in providing the credit conditions for expand- 
ing slave labor in America. The transformation toward less restrictive 
land policies also likely increased the treatment of land as a commod- 
ity, expanded the market for land, and advanced the economy in 
America toward modern capitalism. 
As we shall see, the status of the colonies as colonies in the British 
Empire, the colonists' desire for credit to develop the nascent colonial 
economy, and the direct oversight of colonial legislatures by Parlia- 
ment presented a unique and powerful circumstance in which the law 
of property was radically transformed: American property law was 
fundamentally shaped by its colonial origins. The legal transformation 
set the stage for the more rapid development of the American economy 
- including an expansion of slave labor - and for a political trans- 
formation away from rule by a landed aristocracy toward democracy. 
I. The Protection of Family Ownership 
of Real Property in English Law 
English property law served as the foundation for the property law 
of the colonies. The charters and patents that conveyed legislative 
power to the colonies generally included provisos either prohibiting co- 
lonial legislatures from making laws "repugnant to" the laws of Eng- 
land or requiring that the enacted laws be "not contrary to but as near 
as conveniently may be made agreeable to the Laws, Statutes & Gov- 
ernment of this Our Realm of England."29 This Part describes the 
body of English creditor remedies that served as the original source of 
colonial law. 
The English law of property was defined by stark distinctions in 
the treatment afforded real property and personal property.30 The 
29 Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire 44-45 (2005); see also Mary Sarah 
Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution 40 (2004); Joseph Henry Smith, Ap- 
peals to the Privy Council from the American Plantations 525 (1950). 
30 "Real" property includes all possessory interests in land held for indeterminate periods, such 
as fee simple estates, defeasible fees, and life estates. "Chattel" property includes moveables, such 
as livestock and physical possessions, as well as possessory interests in land held for specifically 
determined periods, such as leases (referred to as "chattels real" as opposed to "chattels personal"). 
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unique status of land in English law derived from its historical role as 
the foundation of economic, political, and social life. As the eminent 
English legal historian J.H. Baker explains, land "outlives its inhabi- 
tants, is immune from destruction by man, and therefore provides a 
suitably firm base for institutions of government and wealth."31 In 
England from the late medieval period through the modern era, own- 
ership of landed estates was associated with political privileges ranging 
from, at the highest levels, membership in the House of Lords to local 
political offices and social influence.32 According to Baker, u[c]ontrol 
of land could not ... be readily divorced from power and jurisdiction, 
from 'lordship'."33 
English law was characterized by a clear preference for maintain- 
ing the integrity and cohesiveness of landed estates over the genera- 
tions.34 The most obvious example of this preference was the domi- 
nance of the intestacy doctrine of primogeniture, administered until 
1925, which passed all real property ownership interests to the eldest 
male heir, thereby ensuring that the estate in land would remain con- 
centrated in one undivided parcel.35 The economic value of the heir's 
J.H. Baker describes the distinction between real and personal property as "[t]he most fundamen- 
tal distinction in the English law of property." J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH 
LEGAL HISTORY 223 (4th ed. 2002). Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland characterize the 
division of all material things into these two classes as "one of the main outlines of [English] me- 
dieval law." 2 Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of 
English Law Before the Time of Edward I, at 2 (2d ed. 1968). 
31 Baker, supra note 30, at 223. 
32 As A.W.B. Simpson has noted, in England through the late eighteenth century, land was 
acquired more frequently to gain "locally based political and social power" than for reasons of 
geographic mobility or for economic production. Simpson, supra note 2, at 33. The House of 
Lords was constituted by the peers of the realm, a group of approximately two hundred landown- 
ers of large estates who held hereditary titles of nobility that passed by inheritance. See WOOD, 
supra note 20, at 25. In 188 1, a study of English land ownership relying on The New Domesday 
Book of 187 1 estimated that "a landed aristocracy consisting of about 2,250 persons own together 
nearly half the enclosed land in England and Wales." GEORGE C. BRODRICK, ENGLISH LAND 
AND ENGLISH LANDLORDS 165 (London, Cassel, Petter, Galpin & Co. 1881). 
33 BAKER, supra note 30, at 223. 
34 See generally David Sugarman & Ronnie Warrington, Land Law, Citizenship, and the In- 
vention of "Englishness": The Strange World of the Equity of Redemption, in EARLY MODERN 
CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY hi, 121-25 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995) (emphasiz- 
ing English law's support of the landed class). This legal preference reflected a powerful social 
preference for cohesive estates. See JOHN HABAKKUK, MARRIAGE, DEBT AND THE ESTATES 
SYSTEM: ENGLISH LANDOWNERSHIP, 1650-1950, at 55 (1994) ("The sense of obligation to keep 
the patrimony intact and in the family was so strong that the owner of an inherited estate of any 
reasonable size and antiquity, even when he was the last of his line and was free to dispose of the 
property, did not naturally consider selling it, unless his financial circumstances obliged him to do 
so. He sought among his friends or acquaintances for someone to continue the undivided 
ownership . . . ."). 
35 See Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 45 (Eng.) (abolishing primogeni- 
ture in England); 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *2 14-16 (discussing primogeniture); 4 KENT, 
supra note 14, at 377-80 (same); see also HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT 17-44 
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ownership interest was typically circumscribed in a family "settlement" 
agreement entered into at the time of marriage that often included 
charges on the land for the benefit of the landowner's mother (her 
dower or jointure interests as a widow), his wife (specified pin money), 
and "portions" for younger siblings (either in lump sums or in annui- 
ties).36 The settlement would outline the nature of the landowner's 
tenancy, which could range from, on one extreme, a fee simple interest 
in some or all of the lands to, on the other, a life estate with no powers 
of conveyance and with trustees appointed to preserve the contingent 
remainder on behalf of future generations.37 The present possessor's 
interest could also be circumscribed by a will "entailing" the land such 
that the land would descend through the family line in perpetuity, with 
each generation obtaining only a life interest. Settlements and entails, 
however, provided for wealth distribution within the family while 
appointing one person (typically the eldest son) as manager of the 
entire estate. It was expected that each generation would pass the es- 
tate to the next in a similar, or hopefully an augmented, condition.38 
(2005) (describing primogeniture as the centerpiece of a broader political and social order based on 
a patriarchal ideology). 
36 For a description of a typical settlement agreement, see BAKER, supra note 30, at 293-94. 
The customary practice was for the family estate to be "resettled" in every generation, to account 
for events such as deaths, births, and marriages. Id. at 294. The resettlement process, however, 
was most often used to tighten a family's hold on its real property interests, rather than to remove 
impediments to alienation. According to Baker, "the widespread employment by the landed 
classes of the strict settlement, with resettlement in each generation, served to shackle much of the 
land in England to the same families until Victorian times and beyond." Id. at 295. According to 
Simpson, under the strict settlement: 
[T]he land was managed by a succession of life tenants, the settlement being reconsti- 
tuted each generation to ensure that no single individual ever acquired an unfettered 
power to appropriate the family capital for his individual purposes. It is remarkable 
that in spite of Blackstone's exaltation of private individual property rights, the land- 
owning class in reality had little use for them. 
A.W. Brian Simpson, Introduction to WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES xi (Univ. of 
Chi. Press 1979) (1766); see also John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 
105 YALE L.J. 625, 632-33 (1995) (describing the use of trust devices to provide for wives, daugh- 
ters, and younger sons). 
37 See BAKER, supra note 30, at 293-95. 
38 As described by Sir Lewis Namier: 
The English political family is a compound of "blood", name, and estate, this last 
. . . being the most important of the three .... The name is a weighty symbol, but liable 
to variations; ... the estate ... is, in the long run, the most potent factor in securing con- 
tinuity through identification .... Primogeniture and entails psychically preserve the 
family in that they tend to fix its position through the successive generations, and 
thereby favour conscious identification. 
L.B. Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution 22-23 (1930). As 
later described by Alexis de Tocqueville, who was from a French aristocratic family: 
In peoples where estate law is founded on the right of primogeniture, territorial domains 
pass most often from generation to generation without being divided. The result is that 
family spirit is in a way materialized in the land. The family represents the land, the 
land represents the family; it perpetuates its name, its origin, its glory, its power, its vir- 
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The law of inheritance was crucial to this social and economic 
framework.39 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, England was a com- 
mercially developing society with active land and credit markets. The 
law, however, maintained the cohesion of English estates and protected 
the inheritance of real property from involuntary seizure by creditors 
in two ways. First, English law protected freehold interests in land 
from the claims of all unsecured creditors. Second, the Court of Chan- 
cery protected land by creating procedural hurdles to the seizure of 
land to satisfy secured debts and by privileging families' long-term in- 
terests in land in inheritance proceedings. These laws and practices 
are discussed below. 
A, The Protection of Family Real Property Interests 
in English Courts of Law 
From the late thirteenth century onward in England, unsecured 
creditors who obtained judgments against debtors in the common law 
courts were limited to one of four writs of execution (remedies avail- 
able to enforce judgments at law). First, the writ of fieri facias di- 
rected the sheriff to seize the goods and chattels of the defendant, to 
sell the items, and to deliver the proceeds to the plaintiff.40 Second, 
the writ of levari facias directed the sheriff to seize and sell the 
debtor's goods and chattels, like the writ of fieri facias , but addition- 
tues. It is an imperishable witness to the past and a precious pledge of existence to 
come. 
1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 23, at 48. For a description of more recent debates about the 
social implications of English settlements, see BAKER, supra note 30, at 295. 
39 John Locke, best known today for his emphasis on an individual's natural right to property 
acquired through labor, defended the English inheritance system on the ground that all children 
- irrespective of whether they labored on behalf of the family - naturally enjoyed a shared title 
with their parents to the family property. Locke viewed England's inheritance system as a natu- 
ral consequence of the powerful instinct of humans to procreate, which led to a sense of obligation 
of parents to provide for their children. According to Locke, this principle "gives Children a Title, 
to share in the Property of their Parents, and a Right to Inherit their Possessions. Men are not 
Proprietors of what they have meerly for themselves, their Children have a Title to part of it, and 
have their Kind of Right joyn'd with their Parents." JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 244 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, rev. ed. 1965) (1690). In contrast, 
Blackstone, who described inheritance as the centerpiece of English real property law, was more 
skeptical about inheritance and justified it on the basis of convenience - relatives were more 
likely to be close to the deceased, and possibly in possession of the deceased's property at the time 
of death - rather than on the basis of natural law. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *i 1-12; 
see also Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance, supra note 20, at 4-9 (discussing theo- 
ries of inheritance posited by Locke, Blackstone, and others). 
40 See BAKER, supra note 30, at 66; 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *4i7. 
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ally imposed a lien on behalf of the creditor on the future earnings of 
the debtor's real property until the debt was satisfied.41 
Third, the writ of elegit allowed for a limited possessory interest in 
the debtor's real property.42 Under the writ of elegit, the sheriff ob- 
tained an appraisal of the debtor's goods and chattels, and the creditor 
accepted the goods at the appraised value. If the debtor's chattel 
property failed to satisfy the debt, the creditor acquired a tenancy of 
one half of the debtor's real property for the number of years necessary 
to satisfy the remainder of the debt, based on a court-ordered ap- 
praisal.43 The debtor retained possession of half of his property, as 
well as "his Oxen and Beasts of his Plough,"44 presumably to ensure 
that he was able to fulfill his obligations to his landlord and to the 
King, as well as to provide for his family. A closely related but more 
valuable remedy could be obtained if a debtor appeared in the Mer- 
chant Court or the Staple Court to formally acknowledge his debt. 
These Courts offered creditors the remedy of a temporary tenancy of 
all of the debtor's land until the debt was satisfied (a "tenancy by ex- 
tent")*5 Creditors who took possession of their debtors' property as 
tenants by elegit or extent could maximize the productivity of the land 
during the years of their tenancy.46 
Fourth, under the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum, the sheriff 
seized the body of the debtor for imprisonment.47 While the debtor 
was in prison, the creditor could not force a seizure of the debtor's 
land.48 The principal use of the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum with 
regard to landowners was to threaten the debtor and his family in or- 
41 See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *4i7-i8; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 30, 
at 596. 
42 Parliament introduced the writ of elegit in 1285 as part of Edward I's reform of feudal law. 
See Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw., c. 18 (1285) (Eng.); see also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
2, at *4i8 (describing the writ of elegit). The impact of this statute on the closing of the commons 
in England is an intriguing topic that no scholar has examined. Once creditors gained possessory 
rights to land (however partial) and became willing to offer credit on the basis of these rights, one 
would imagine that the incentives for individuals to own parcels in fee simple absolute would 
dramatically increase: only fee simple owners would have access to the additional credit. 
43 See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *4i8-io.. 
44 13 Edw., c. 18. 
45 See Statute of the Staple, 27 Edw. 3, c. 9 (1353); Statute of Merchants, 13 Edw., c. 1 (1285). 
46 When it was introduced, the tenancy by elegit represented an expansion of creditors' rights. 
Blackstone described the elegit as a "speedier way for the recovery of debts" and a "benefit to a 
trading people." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *4i9. Creditors were limited only by the 
debtor's ability to sue under the waste doctrine, which prevented creditors from diminishing the 
underlying value of the property. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *227-29. 
47 See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *4 14-15. Peers and other Members of Parliament, as 
well as executors of estates, were exempt from this remedy. Id. at *4i4- 
48 See id. at *4 19-20 (explaining that it was possible "that body and goods may be taken in 
execution, or land and goods; but not body and land too, upon any judgment between subject and 
subject in the course of the common law"). 
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der to encourage them to pay the debt at issue or to provide security 
for the debt.49 Less frequently, a debtor would use debtors' prison to 
his advantage by having a "friendly" creditor imprison him to allow 
his family to remain in possession of all of his freehold lands.50 
Notably, each of these writs provided a remedy to creditors while 
protecting the integrity of the estate and without jeopardizing a land- 
owner's freehold interest in his land and the heir's ability to inherit it. 
The writ of fieri facias, as mentioned, was limited to the debtor's 
goods and chattels. The writ of levari facias allowed the seizure of the 
income from land for a temporary period. The writ of elegit offered a 
creditor temporary possessory rights (not a fee simple interest) in one 
half (not all) of a debtor's land. The writ of capias ad satisfaciendum 
threatened the debtor, but not his land. 
Moreover, each of these remedies was limited to the life of the 
debtor. According to the prevailing custom, when a property owner 
died, the unsecured creditors of the deceased instituted debt actions 
against the executors of the deceased's estate.51 The executors of the 
estate assumed control over the deceased's personal property, but not 
the land.52 In the absence of a will, the real property immediately de- 
scended to the eldest male heir. Inherited land never came under an 
executor's control.53 The executors therefore satisfied the debts out of 
the deceased's personal property. Moreover, unsecured creditors had 
no legal recourse against heirs and devisees.54 The landed inheritance 
remained legally protected from all unsecured creditors, unless the de- 
ceased explicitly stated in his will that the land should be sold to pay 
his debts. If the personal property was insufficient to satisfy the debts, 
the unsecured creditors would simply lose the value of the remaining 
debts, unless the heirs and devisees felt obliged to pay the debts out of 
a sense of honor, or desired to extend the ancestor's credit line for their 
own purposes.55 
49 See Joanna Innes, The King's Bench Prison in the Later Eighteenth Century: Law, Author- 
ity and Order in a London Debtors' Prison, in AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE 250, 254 (John 
Brewer & John Styles eds., 1980); see also MANN, supra note 14, at 25 (noting that in colonial 
America, the attachment of a debtor's body was often a tactic "to obtain security for the debt, ei- 
ther from the debtor or from sympathetic friends or relatives"). 
50 See Innes, supra note 49, at 256. Once the debtor left jail, if the debt remained unsatisfied, 
the creditor could then sue for a writ of elegit. Such principles did not apply in the merchant and 
staple courts. 
51 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *5 10-12. 
52 For a discussion of what constituted chattel property over which the executors assumed 
control, see BAKER, supra note 30, at 380-81. 
53 See id. 
54 See 2 POLLOCK & Maitland, supra note 30, at 336. 
55 See HABAKKUK, supra note 34, at 307-12. 
404 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:385 
B. The Protection of Family Real Property Interests 
in the Chancery Court 
Under English law, real property was alienable so long as manda- 
tory formalities were satisfied.56 An owner of a fee simple absolute 
could sell or mortgage land57 or devise it to a non-family member.58 
Secured creditors - who extended credit on the basis of specific 
pledges of land as collateral, formalized by signatures and the debtors' 
seals - could force a seizure of the real property that was pledged.59 
Moreover, secured creditors had the ability to bind future heirs to 
secured credit agreements by explicitly stating that all "heirs, execu- 
tors, and administrators" were responsible for the debt.60 When the 
generic "heirs" were made parties to the secured credit agreement, the 
creditor could pursue a cause of action against the heir after the 
debtor's death, and the heir might be compelled to discharge the debt 
out of the real property that he inherited. The remedies of secured 
creditors were strengthened by a 1691 statute that provided secured 
creditors with causes of action against both devisees and heirs of a de- 
ceased debtor.61 Under the statute, attempts by the deceased to devise 
land that he had pledged as security, or by the heirs or devisees to 
transfer such land, were deemed fraudulent.62 
56 In the early seventeenth century both in England and in the colonies, landowners formal- 
ized the transfer of title to land by livery of seisin, a public ceremony, as well as by written deeds. 
The Statute of Frauds abolished livery of seisin and required written formalities for transferring 
title to real property. See An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 3 
(1676). 
57 In 1290, Parliament enacted the Statute Quia Emptores Terrarum ("Quia Emptores"), 18 
Edw., c. 1 (1290), which was the first legal recognition of the right to alienate real property after 
the Norman Conquest. Historians have established that Quia Emptores reflected Edward I's re- 
sponse to the fact that landowners were already transferring their interests for the purpose of ob- 
taining credit - either by leasing the property or by the process of "subinfeudation." See A.W.B. 
Simpson, An Introduction to the History of the Land Law 22, 50-51 (1961). 
Subinfeudation was a process by which a tenant would sell his possessory interest in land to a 
third party. See id. Subinfeudation could be economically detrimental to the lord, particularly if 
the tenant subinfeuded to a religious corporation that, as an organizational form, would not give 
rise to the incidents (payments) linked to family-related events, such as a tenant's marriage (the 
lord could sell an heir in marriage) and death (wardship, relief, and escheat). See id. Quia Emp- 
tores was enacted to formalize the requirement that those in possession of land held the land by 
the same feudal obligations as their predecessors. See id. 
58 The Statute of Wills of 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1, gave landowners the freedom to devise their 
lands to whomever they chose. See BAKER, supra note 30, at 256. 
59 See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *34O. 
60 The identity of the actual person who would inherit, of course, was unknown until the time 
of death. 
61 An Act for Relief of Creditors Against Fraudulent Devises (Statute of Fraudulent Devises), 
3&4 W. &M., c. 14(1691). 
62 Id. § 2. The statute closed a loophole that had denied secured creditors a remedy against 
heirs when the heirs sold the land they had inherited before the creditor filed a claim in court 
against them. See id. § 5. 
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Secured creditors seeking to seize the land the debtor had pledged, 
however, could not do so simply by bringing an action at law.63 In the 
early seventeenth century, the Court of Chancery determined that a 
mortgagor held an equity right to redeem the land within a reasonable 
period, irrespective of the actual terms of the mortgage agreement.64 
Recognition of the "equity of redemption" meant that to gain secure 
title in the fee interest, the mortgagee (the lender) was required to ob- 
tain both a legal judgment in the common law courts on the debt and 
a separate decree of foreclosure in the Court of Chancery, quieting the 
equity of redemption.65 
Chancery, however, was known for its high costs and procedural 
delays.66 Actions in Chancery inevitably took a long time because the 
docket was large, the court did not meet continuously, and all relevant 
parties were given an opportunity to be heard.67 Most important, se- 
cured creditors seeking to seize land that had been pledged as security 
had to contend with the claims of family members in all preexisting 
family settlement agreements.68 Settlement agreements established 
prior claims against the land over subsequent secured creditors.69 
Contending with family members who claimed under family settle- 
ment agreements was likely to be the costliest component of foreclos- 
ing in Chancery. In addition, the requirement that heirs were bound 
only by mortgage agreements that explicitly named them as a party 
was expanded by the English courts into a broader "privilege" allow- 
63 The early form of mortgage involved a conveyance of land to the creditor (the mortgagee) in 
return for a sum of money. The agreement typically provided that when the debtor repaid money 
plus interest, title to the land would revert back to the borrower. If the mortgagor did not repay 
the loan, he would forfeit the land. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *34O, *465; 2 POL- 
LOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 30, at 122. In the common law courts, mortgage agreements 
were interpreted strictly. See SIMPSON, supra note 57, at 226-27. A delay of any sort in tender- 
ing payment under the mortgage could result in the loss of the entire property interest to the 
creditor, even when the value of the mortgage was less than the value of the land. See id. 
Bonds were structured similarly. If a creditor obtained a judgment against a debtor under a 
bond, the court would direct the sheriff first to try to satisfy the debt out of the obligor's personal 
estate. If the personal estate was insufficient, then the debt would be discharged out of the real 
property. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *34O-4i, *465. 
64 See SIMPSON, supra note 57, at 227-29; R.W. TURNER, THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION 
26-27 (1931); Sugarman & Warrington, supra note 34, at 1 13-14. 
65 See Henry Horwitz, Chancery Equity Records and Proceedings, 1600-1800, 
at 4 & n.14, 31 (1995). 
66 According to Baker, "[f]or two centuries before Dickens wrote Bleak House, the word 
'Chancery' had become synonymous with expense, delay and despair." BAKER, supra note 30, at 
in. 
67 Chancery court procedures are described in HORWITZ, supra note 65, at 9-26. See also 
BAKER, supra note 30, at 1 1 1-12 (describing the "defects" of chancery procedure). 
68 The 1 69 1 statute against fraudulent devises clarified that notwithstanding its provisions, 
family settlement agreements made in writing before marriage would continue to be recognized 
"in full force." 3 & 4 W. & M., c. 14, § 4 (169 1). 
w 3&4W. &M., c. 14, §4(1691). 
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ing the heir a procedural right to contest any action in which he might 
lose the landed inheritance. Blackstone, in describing the features of 
what he referred to as the "absolute" right of property, emphasized the 
English laws stating that "no man shall be disinherited, nor put out of 
his franchises or freehold, unless he be unduly brought to answer, and 
be forejudged by course of law."70 The heir's procedural right to be a 
party to litigation in which the freehold might be lost was in addition 
to the procedural rights of devisees and family members who had 
separate legal claims to the wealth inherent in the land through family 
settlements. 
Moreover, prior to the chancery court's formal foreclosure decree, 
and at times after the foreclosure decree, the mortgagor was permitted 
to redeem the property from the mortgagee by paying the remaining 
amount due on the mortgage, plus interest and costs.71 These compli- 
cated procedures for foreclosure added costs to the process of acquiring 
title to land under a mortgage. 
Chancery court judges also at times exercised discretion on behalf 
of family members at the expense of creditors in order to pursue a pol- 
icy of privileging families' long-term interests in land.72 In his study of 
chancery court decisions, Adam Hofri-Winogradow describes examples 
of Chancery interpreting a will as entailing land on behalf of the pos- 
sible future children of a then-childless, estranged couple in their fifties 
(a couple not likely to have children) in order to prevent a sale of the 
land to pay debts.73 Chancery judges chose to preserve the family's 
ownership of land when faced with language in a will that was am- 
biguous as to whether the realty should be sold to pay debts.74 More- 
70 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *i34-35. 
71 For anecdotal evidence of the difficulty even secured creditors faced getting landowners to 
pay their debts, see John Habakkuk, Presidential Address: The Rise and Fall of English Landed 
Families, 1600-1800: II (Nov. 16, 1979), in 30 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC'Y (5th ser.) 
199, 208-10 (1980). For a detailed discussion of foreclosure, see Sheldon Tefft, The Myth of Strict 
Foreclosure, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 576-82 (1937) (describing opportunities given to mortgagors 
to extend the right to redeem during and even after conclusion of the foreclosure process). 
72 See Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, Protection of Family Property Against Creditors in the 
Enlightenment-Era Court of Chancery (Aug. 4, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library). A careful examination of the chancery court and its decisions has 
been absent from legal historical scholarship. Adam Hofri-Winogradow 's Ph.D. dissertation, in 
progress at Oxford University, promises to contribute to this scholarship. In one chapter, Hofri- 
Winogradow analyzes the numerous ways in which the chancery court privileged the long-term 
interest in family property over the claims of creditors and family members in the eighteenth cen- 
tury. Id. at 17-33. Hofri-Winogradow 's conclusions confirm what scholars have long suspected 
about Chancery. Robert W. Gordon, for example, has noted that, "while the common law pro- 
moted alienability, equity promoted dynastic preservation." Robert W. Gordon, Paradoxical 
Property, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 95, 104 (John Brewer & Susan 
Staves eds., 1995). 
73 Hofri-Winogradow, supra note 72, at 20. 
74 Id. at 22-25. 
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over, chancery judges upheld family settlement agreements that pro- 
tected land when faced with creditors' challenges to the validity of 
those agreements.75 
Chancery's general policy was to protect the integrity of the family 
estate in land whenever possible. The most prominent example of this 
policy is that mortgage debts, in which parcels of land were specifi- 
cally pledged as collateral, were charged to the landowner's personal 
property first, rather than to the real property that had been pledged 
as security. The mortgaged land would be sold only if the personal 
property was insufficient to pay the debt.76 By paying mortgage debts 
with chattel property, Chancery reduced the encumbrances on the 
family land. In doing so, it privileged the heir at the expense of the 
deceased's other children, who typically shared equal portions of the 
deceased's personal property after the unsecured debts were paid.77 
* * * * 
In sum, the English legal regime of the early modern era allowed 
free alienation, but the common law courts offered no remedy that di- 
rectly threatened a family's freehold interest in land. The Court of 
Chancery further protected the integrity of estates and the inheritance 
of land by recognizing the equity of redemption and by privileging 
landed inheritance over the interests of creditors in its proceedings. 
The presence of these protections on land ownership, however, did 
not mean that English landowners never sold their land to satisfy un- 
secured debts. The most common circumstance in which family prop- 
erty was sold was when a landowning family's debt became so large 
(possibly after accumulating over the generations) that, without a sale 
of land, family members were unable to access credit for resources 
needed to manage the remaining property.78 In addition, the threat of 
debtors' prison or of the sheriff stripping away all of the family's 
goods and chattels and selling them at auction also induced landown- 
75 Id. at 28. 
76 This practice was overturned by statute in 1854. $ee An Act To Amend the Law Relating 
to the Administration of the Estates of Deceased Persons, 17 & 18 Viet., c. 113 (1854) (Eng.); see 
also BRODRICK, supra note 32, at 345 (describing the practice as a "monstrous perversion of 
justice"). 
77 The equity courts protected landed inheritance in one other way in the early modern era: to 
ensure the transmission to the heir of the entire estate in land, by common practice the heir was 
exempted from a rule that money advanced to sons during their father's lifetime should be de- 
ducted from the share they received at his death. See BRODRICK, supra note 32, at 345. 
78 For an extended discussion of the occasions when English landowners, however reluctantly, 
sold their real property, see Christopher Clay, Property Settlements, Financial Provision for the 
Family, and Sale of Land by the Greater Landowners, 1660-1790, 21 J. BRIT. STUD. 18 (1981). 
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ers to sell their real property to pay unsecured creditors.79 Landown- 
ers whose powers to convey property were circumscribed in family set- 
tlements could petition for a private Act of Parliament to allow a sale 
of settled land.80 An entail could be removed through a conveyance 
referred to as a "common recovery."81 
In each of these circumstances, however, the law gave landowners 
the privilege to choose to sell the land, and the land was sold only on 
terms to which they consented. The inability of an individual unse- 
cured creditor to force a seizure and sale of the land gave landowners 
important opportunities to delay the repayment of their debts. English 
law therefore limited the extent to which a family's ownership interest 
in land would be subject to commercial and other financial risks. This 
was the legal regime brought over and instituted in the American 
colonies. The next Part explains how colonial and parliamentary legis- 
lation had dismantled this body of laws throughout the American 
colonies by 1732. 
II. The Transformation of Property Law 
in Colonial America 
A. Colonial Creditors' Remedies Against the Land 
Prior to Parliamentary Regulation 
The originating documents and early statutes of many colonies 
promised adherence to the English protections to real property from 
creditors' claims. New York's 1683 Charter of Liberties, for example, 
promised its residents that lands would not be characterized as chattel 
property, but as "an estate of inheritance" according to the laws of 
England.82 The Charter explicitly stated that courts in New York had 
no authority to "grant out any Execucon or other writt whereby any 
79 Clay found that "the prospect of inheriting a house stripped bare of furnishing, even bed- 
ding, let alone valuables, a home farm without livestock or implements, and possibly a park de- 
nuded of timber" left families with little alternative other than to agree to the barring of an entail 
or to request a private act of Parliament to allow the sale of real property held in life estate. Id. 
at 25. 
80 Private acts of Parliament to allow the sale of land are the subject of Habakkuk, supra note 
7i. 
81 The common recovery involved a conveyance of entailed land to an accomplice in fee sim- 
ple, with a third party paid to provide a false warranty of title. Under the law, the remainder- 
man's only recourse was against the real property of the party who provided the false warranty of 
title, and the people who typically agreed to perform this function were people (usually petty offi- 
cials) who owned no real property. The "barred issue" were therefore left without a meaningful 
remedy. See BAKER, supra note 30, at 282. 
82 The Charter of Libertyes and Priviledges Granted by His Royall Highnesse to the Inhabi- 
tants of New Yorke and Its Dependencyes (1683), in 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 
in, 114 (Albany, James B. Lyon 1896). 
2oo6] CREATING AN AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 409 
mans Land may be sold . . . without the owners Consent."83 A 1647 
Connecticut statute adopted the English body of remedies, clarifying 
that creditors could take possession of debtors' land only until their 
debts were satisfied, as under the writ of elegit.84 
Indeed, several colonies adopted remedial regimes that were even 
more protective of land than the English regime in that they omitted 
the writ of elegit. The absence of the writ of elegit likely reflected the 
fact that a temporary possessory interest in land was not a valuable 
remedy in the early stages of agricultural development when profits 
from land were low. A Virginia statute of 1705 thus outlined the pro- 
cedures according to which sheriffs could seize either the "goods and 
chattels" or the body of a debtor to satisfy his debts.85 Maryland stat- 
utes enacted in 1705 and 17 15 limited execution to the seizure of 
"goods chattels and credits" to satisfy debts.86 A Jamaican statute of 
1 68 1 allowed the sheriff to seize "goods and chattels," and if the goods 
and chattels were insufficient, then "negroes, working cattle, or neces- 
sary utensils," but did not mention the writ of elegit or other claims 
against the land.87 In St. Kitts, the writ of elegit was not available, 
freehold property interests were entirely immune from the claims of 
unsecured creditors, and freehold property owners were exempt from 
arrest and placement in debtors' prison.88 
83 Id. 
84 Code of Laws (1650), in Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut 509, 
5 18-20 (J. Hammond Trumbull ed., Hartford, Brown & Parsons 1850). 
85 An Act Directing the Manner of Levying Executions, and for Relief of Poor Prisoners for 
Debt, ch. 37 (1705), in 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA 385 (William Waller Hening ed., Phila., Thomas Desilver 1823) [hereinafter 3 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA]. The writ of elegit, allowing creditors a possessory interest in debtors' land, 
was not introduced in Virginia until 1726. See An Act To Declare the Law Concerning Execu- 
tions, ch. 3, § 3 (1726), in 4 The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA 151, 152-56 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Samuel Pleasants 1814) 
[hereinafter 4 LAWS OF VIRGINIA] (describing process of execution under writs oi fieri facias, 
capias ad satisfaciendum, and elegit). 
86 An Act Directing the Manner of Suing Out Attachments in This Province and Limiting the 
Extent of Them (1704), in ALL THE LAWS OF MARYLAND NOW IN FORCE 4, 4 (Annapolis, 
Thomas Reading 1707); see also An Act Directing the Manner of Suing Out Attachments in This 
Province, and Limiting the Extent of Them (1715), in A COMPLEAT COLLECTION OF THE 
LAWS OF MARYLAND 81, 83 (Annapolis, William Parks 1727) (exempting chattel property that 
would "deprive [debtors] of all Livelihood for the Future[, such as] Corn for necessary Mainte- 
nance, Bedding, Gun, Axe, Pot and Labourers necessary Tools, and such like Houshold- 
Implements and Ammunition for Subsistence"). 
87 An Act for Establishing Courts, and Directing the Marshal's Proceedings, Act 19 (1681), in 
1 Acts of Assembly, Passed in the Island of Jamaica 26, 29 (Kingston, Alexander 
Aikman 1787). 
88 See Richard Pares, Merchants and Planters 45, 87 n.50 (i960) (citing Minutes of 
Council Assembly (July 5, 1684), Public Records Office, Colonial Office Papers 1/57 no. 48). Simi- 
larly, freehold property owners of ten acres were exempt from arrest in Barbados until the mar- 
shal had attempted to satisfy the debt owed by means of seizing all of the chattel property and 
land of the debtor. See id.; JONATHAN BLUMEAU, REMARKS ON SEVERAL ACTS OF 
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Merchants lending to residents of these colonies, however, often 
complained about the fact that the law offered unsecured creditors no 
remedies against debtors' land. In 17 15, the Board of Trade issued a 
formal Instruction to the Governor of Jamaica directing him to per- 
suade the legislature to introduce a remedy against the land by elegit 
or extent. The Instruction described the lack of such a remedy as "a 
great prejudice to creditors and discredit to trade."89 
Others emphasized that the English legal regime threatened credit 
because English inheritance laws protected land from unsecured credi- 
tors when a debtor died. As an example, Robert Carter, one of the 
most prominent planters in Virginia, complained that he suffered the 
negative impact of these laws personally after lending money or goods 
to a Mr. Lee.90 After Lee died, Carter found that his personal property 
was insufficient to satisfy his debts, but that his estate included re- 
cently acquired land. Carter suspected that Lee had purchased the 
land to avoid paying his debts "just as Lee found himself tottering, to 
defraud his creditors, and to do something for his wife and children at 
other men's cost."91 In a 1720 letter to his son John, Carter described 
his concern about the impact on credit of applying English protections 
to land from unsecured creditors: 
If this be law, we in the Plantations are in a very dangerous condition, for 
we have nothing but the merchants' accounts for our security, and any 
merchant for the advancement of his family may throw all the money he 
has of others to purchase a real estate with; and when he's dead his family 
goes into the possession of it and his claimers are without remedy.92 
A 1723 letter from a Virginia factor to the Bristol merchant Isaac 
Hobhouse described a similar problem.93 The factor explained that 
the merchant would not likely be paid because the debtor's land had 
descended to the debtor's son: 
Its my Opinion yt Mr Lyd's nor yr Selves wont be half pd without ye 
Land could be Sold: wch wont be done by no means what ever: for its 
Left to ye Son of Mr Robt Baylor after ye Death of Jno Baylor: wch is a 
very Strong Argument for: Robt not to agree to ye Sale . . . .94 
Parliament Relating More Especially to the Colonies Abroad n-12 (London, T. 
Cooper 1742). 
89 Get Act Making Jamaica Lands Extendable (17 15), in 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO 
British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776, at 339, 339 (Leonard Woods Labaree ed., 1967). 
90 See Letter from Robert Carter to John Carter (July 19, 1720), in LETTERS OF ROBERT 
CARTER, 1720-1727^32 (Louis B. Wright ed., 1940). 
91 Id. at 33. 
92 Id. at 32. 
93 Letter from John Dixon to Isaac Hobhouse et al. (May 2, 1723), in The Virginia Letters of 
Isaac Hobhouse, Merchant of Bristol (Walter E. Minchinton ed.), 66 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIO- 
GRAPHY 278, 291 (1958). 
94 Id. (typeface altered for readability). 
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In an effort to attract credit on better terms, however, the legisla- 
tures of some colonies offered greater protections to creditors than ex- 
isted under English laws and Chancery practices. As mentioned, the 
colonial charters and patents typically authorized the colonial legisla- 
tures to enact laws that were "not repugnant" to the laws of England. 
In most cases, the repugnancy requirement was understood to mean 
that English law applied in the colonies. Colonial enactments that re- 
formed English law for the purpose of advancing creditors' interests 
were not automatically repugnant to English law, however, because 
they were consistent with another overarching and widely accepted 
English policy, that the role of the colonies within the British Empire 
was to advance English mercantilist economic interests.95 Moreover, 
English authorities came to accept that not all English laws and prac- 
tices were appropriate to unique local conditions.96 The English au- 
thorities were amenable to legal reforms that responded to local needs 
and that advanced the interests of the Empire by providing greater se- 
curity to English creditors. 
Some colonial legislatures made modest modifications to the Eng- 
lish remedial regime. The legislature of New Plymouth (later part of 
Massachusetts), for example, enacted a law in 1633 that departed from 
English law by stating that if a creditor could demonstrate that a 
debtor had purchased land for the purpose of avoiding the payment of 
his unsecured debts, then the court would allow the seizure of his free- 
hold interest in land to satisfy those debts.97 The law provided, how- 
ever, that notwithstanding any improper motives of the debtor in pur- 
chasing the land, if the land was found to be necessary for the 
subsistence of the deceased's family, "such lands remaine to the survi- 
vors his or her heires no seizure being allowed the creditors in that 
case."98 William Penn's Charter of Liberties of 1682 included a section 
that departed from English law by providing generally for the liability 
of lands for debts.99 The Charter of Liberties, however, protected the 
inheritance rights of eldest sons by stating that once a debtor had a 
95 See Claire Priest, Law and Commerce, 1580-1815, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW 
IN AMERICA (forthcoming 2008) (examining English mercantilism and its rejection in founding- 
era America). 
96 In her recent study of the transatlantic legal culture of Rhode Island, Mary Sarah Bilder 
notes that "[a]s an English colony, Rhode Island's laws and governmental structures were to re- 
flect those of England. As a far-off English colony, however, these laws and structures were ex- 
pected to be in some way divergent." BlLDER, supra note 29, at 3. 
97 See Act of July 1, 1633, in THE COMPACT WITH THE CHARTER AND LAWS OF THE 
COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH 31, 33 (William Brigham ed., Boston, Dutton & Wentworth 
1836). 
9« Id. 
99 See Penn's Charter of Liberties of 1682, Laws Agreed upon in England § 14 (Pa.), in 5 THE 
Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic 
LAWS 3047, 3061 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). 
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child, only one third of his land would be available to satisfy his 
debts.100 
In 1700, however, the Pennsylvania legislature radically revised its 
remedial regime and adopted a statute making all of a debtor's land 
available to satisfy unsecured debts, even if the debtor had a child.101 
Five years later, the Pennsylvania legislature apparently decided that 
its law subjected landowners to excessive financial risk. It enacted a 
new law (which, notably, became the law of the Northwest Territory in 
I79S)102 according to which if the debt could be satisfied out of the 
earnings from the debtor's land within seven years, then the creditor 
would be limited to a tenancy by elegit, that is, possession of the land 
for a term.103 But if an unsecured debt was so large that it could not 
be satisfied with seven years' worth of earnings, the land would be 
sold at auction.104 
The 1705 Pennsylvania statute also tried to improve the terms of 
secured credit within the colony by replacing mortgagors' equitable 
redemption rights, recognized in equity, with a statutory redemption 
right, enforced in the law courts. According to the statute, the use of 
mortgages for the "payment of monies" was widespread, but mortgages 
were "no effectual security, considering how low the annual profits of 
tenements and improved lands are here, and the discouragements 
which the mortgagees meet with, by reason of the equity of redemp- 
tion remaining in the mortgagers."105 The statute allowed mortgagees 
to force the sale of mortgaged land no sooner than one year from the 
day on which a debt was owed. At the end of the year, the mortgagor 
100 The precise language of section 14 of the Charter states that "all lands and goods shall be 
liable to pay debts, except where there is legal issue, and then all the goods, and one-third of the 
land only." Id. 
101 See An Act for Taking Lands in Execution for the Payment of Debts, Where the Sheriff 
Cannot Come at Other Effects to Satisfy the Same, ch. 48, pmbl. (1700), in 1 LAWS OF THE 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 7, 7 (Phila., John Bioren 1810) ("[A]ll lands and houses 
whatsoever, within this government, shall be liable to sale, upon judgment and execution obtained 
against the defendant, the owner, his heirs, executors or administrators, where no sufficient per- 
sonal estate is to be found." (emphasis added)). The Act's stated purpose was "that no creditors 
may be defrauded of the just debts due to them by persons . . . who have sufficient real estates, if 
not personal, to satisfy the same." Id. With respect to the debtor's house, it permitted a one year 
right of redemption, but afterwards it "shall be and remain a free and clear estate to the purchaser 
or creditor, ... his heirs and assigns for ever, as fully and amply as ever they were to the debtor." 
Id. 
102 See infra p. 453. 
103 The statute states that if yearly rents or profits of the lands would satisfy the debt within 
seven years, then the lands would be delivered to the plaintiff "until the debt or damages be levied 
by a reasonable extent, in the same manner and method as lands are delivered upon writs of ele- 
gits in England." An Act for Taking Lands in Execution for Payment of Debts, ch. 152, § 2 
(1705), in 1 Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, supra note 101, at 57, 58. 
104 See id. § 3, at 58. 
105 Id. § 6, at 59. 
2oo6] CREATING AN AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 413 
or his or her "heirs, executors or administrators" were given the proce- 
dural privilege of an opportunity to contest the sale in court.106 If he 
or they could not provide an acceptable defense to the court action, the 
property was to be sold at auction, with a fee simple title going to the 
purchaser.107 
Some colonial legislatures experimented with more fundamental 
changes to the English real property and inheritance laws in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In Barbados as early as 
1656, land and slaves were treated as legally equivalent to chattel 
property in all debt collection proceedings.108 The Barbados legisla- 
ture, however, appears to have changed course several times soon 
thereafter. In 1668 the legislature enacted a law declaring slaves to be 
real estate and making both slaves and land exempt from the claims of 
unsecured creditors.109 Then, in a reversal, a 1672 law declared that 
slaves would be treated as chattel and liable to the claims of unsecured 
creditors.110 Creditors of the Barbadian planters, however, complained 
about the exemption of land from the claims of unsecured creditors. A 
royal Instruction of 1673 directed the Barbadian governor to "get the 
assembly of Barbados to reenact that law whereby all lands seized by 
process of law for the satisfaction of debts should be sold as formerly 
by outcry [auction]."111 According to the Instruction, merchants ex- 
tending credit suffered "great inconveniences and prejudice" in trying 
to recover their debts, and failing to strengthen creditors' legal reme- 
dies would "draw certain ruin upon the place."112 Although no statute 
has survived, by 1677 Barbados appears to have returned to the policy 
106 Id. § 6, at 60. 
107 See id.; see also Graff v. Smith's Admors., 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 481, 481-82 (Pa. Ct. Com. PI. 
1789) (discussing the 1700 and 1705 statutes). 
108 See Turner v. Cox, (1853) 8 Moore 289, 301, 14 Eng. Rep. in, 116 (referring to early prac- 
tice in Barbados of selling land for unsecured debt and citing 1745 Barbados law that stated "all 
lands have ever been looked upon as chattels for the payment of debts, though what remains af- 
terwards to descend to the heir-at-law, or go to the devisee" (quoting An Act To Quiet the Inhabi- 
tants of This Island in the Peaceable Possession of Their Estates, No. 35, pmbl. (i745)> in 1 LAWS 
OF BARBADOS 37, 37 (London, William Clowes & Sons 1875)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); 
BLUMEAU, supra note 88, at 18-19 (noting the practice in Barbados of defining "all their Estates" 
as "in the nature of, and no more than, Chattels for the Payment of Debts" and noting that this 
doctrine was "probably set on foot in the Infancy of the Island, for the Encouragement of Trade to 
it"); PARES, supra note 88, at 89 n.59. 
109 See PARES, supra note 88, at 89 n.58; Price, supra note 12, at 306 n.26. For a discussion of 
when slaves were characterized as real or chattel property, see infra pp. 418-21. 
110 See sources cited supra note 109. 
111 Reenact Law for Sale by Outcry of Debtors' Lands, in 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO 
British Colonial Governors, 1670-17 76, supra note 89, at 338, 338-39- 
112 Mat 339. 
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of treating both land and slaves as legally equivalent to chattel for the 
purpose of satisfying debts.113 
Like the practice in Barbados, a Massachusetts law of 1675 was 
revolutionary in that it explicitly permitted a creditor to take an indi- 
vidual's freehold interest in land to satisfy an unsecured debt.114 In 
contrast to the 1705 Pennsylvania statute, the Massachusetts law did 
not establish a minimum debt amount below which creditors would be 
unable to seize debtors' real property.115 Other New England colonies 
enacted similar laws in the same period. In 1682 the legislature of 
West New Jersey enacted a law making land liable for unsecured debts 
if the debtor's personal estate was found to be insufficient to satisfy 
the debts.116 Connecticut enacted a statute in 1702 making lands li- 
able for debts.117 In 1718, New Hampshire adopted a statute making 
113 See Price, supra note 12, at 306 n.26. Richard Pares describes the state of property exemp- 
tion law in the Caribbean prior to 1732 as "a whirl of divergence between islands and of tergiver- 
sation in the same island, out of which one example at least of everything can be found sticking 
out." PARES, supra note 88, at 89 n.58. 
114 See General Court Enactment of May 12, 1675, in 5 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND 
Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England 29 (AMS Press 1968) (Nathaniel 
B. Shurtleff ed., 1854) (stating that the recording of title of "houses & lands taken upon execu- 
tion . . . shall be a legall assurance of such houses & lands to [the plaintiff] & his heires forever," 
meaning that the creditor would have a fee simple title). In 1647, Massachusetts^ first code of 
law, The Book of General Laws and Liberties, provided that a writ of execution should permit an 
officer to levy on the goods and chattels of the debtor. In contrast to the law in England, the offi- 
cer was permitted to break open the doors of the house if necessary. To satisfy criminal fines, the 
officer was permitted to "levie his land or person according to law" if personal property was insuf- 
ficient. The Book of General Laws and Liberties Concerning the Inhabitants 
of Massachusetts 34 (Max Ferrand ed., 1929) (1648). 
A 1692 statute was even more explicit. It provided that "all lands or tenements belonging to 
any person ... in fee simple shall stand charged with the payment of all just debts owing by such 
person, as well as his personal estate, and shall be liable to be taken in execution for satisfaction 
of the same." An Act for Making of Lands and Tenements Liable to the Payment of Debts (1692 
Land Liability Act), ch. 29, § 1 (1692), in 1 THE ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF 
THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY 68, 68-69 (Boston, Wright & Potter 1869) [hereinafter ACTS AND 
RESOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS]. The statute then clarifies that it intends the conveyance of 
the entire fee simple interest to creditors. It provides that, after the transfer of title was recorded 
in the county registry, the creditor would have a "good title" to the real property, for "his heirs and 
assigns forever." Id. § 1, at 69. This Act was disallowed by the Privy Council in 1695 because it 
failed to provide for debts due to the Crown. See 1 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF MASSACHU- 
SETTS, supra, at 69 (noting that the Act was repealed for this reason). The Act was then reen- 
acted in 1696 with a provision specifying that debts due to the Crown had priority over all other 
debts. See An Act for Making of Lands and Tenements Liable to the Payment of Debts, ch. 10 
(1696), in 1 Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, supra, at 254. 
115 See 1692 Land Liability Act § 1, at 69. 
116 See The Acts and Laws of the General Free Assembly, ch. 12 (1682) (W. Jersey), in The 
Grants, Concessions, and Original Constitutions of the Province of New 
JERSEY 442, 447 (Aaron Learning & Jacob Spicer eds., Phila., Honeyman & Co. 188 1). The Act 
states that its purpose is to "prevent[] . . . fraud, deceit and collusions, between debtor and credi- 
tor, and that creditors may not be hindered from the recovery of their just debts." Id. 
117 See Executions Act, in ACTS AND LAWS OF His MAJESTIES COLONY OF CONNECTI- 
CUT IN NEW-ENGLAND 32 (Boston, Bartholomew Green & John Allen 1702). 
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lands, but not houses, liable for the debts of a debtor who was alive.118 
Upon the debtor's death, however, the executor could distribute the 
lands and the house of the deceased debtor to his creditors.119 
The New England and post- 167 7 Barbados practices modified 
English law in two important respects. First, they enabled a creditor 
to force a seizure of a debtor's freehold interest in land in addition to 
his personal property to satisfy an unsecured debt. In Massachusetts 
after 1701, for example, the legislatively prescribed form for the writ of 
fieri facias directed the sheriff to seize the debtor's "goods, chattels or 
lands," instead of simply "goods and chattels."120 The writ of elegit fell 
out of use entirely because obtaining title to a debtor's land was more 
valuable than possessing the land. 
Still, the New England colonies and Barbados, unlike Pennsylvania 
and Delaware, imposed a unique limitation on creditors' remedies. 
Lands seized in execution were not sold at public auction as chattel 
property ordinarily would have been; the laws in these colonies instead 
provided that real property would be appraised and then transferred 
to creditors in satisfaction of their judgments.121 The creditors thus 
had to accept an in-kind remedy, not cash after an auction. 
The second important effect of the New England and Barbados 
practices was to extend the law to allow unsecured creditors priority 
over the heirs in the distribution of the deceased's real property. The 
1692 Massachusetts statute explicitly stated that it intended to remedy 
the problem that, although debtors' houses and lands "give them 
credit," some debtors are "remiss in paying of their just debts" and 
118 See An Act for Making of Lands and Tenements Liable to the Payment of Debts (17 18), in 
Acts and Laws of His Majesty's Province of New Hampshire, in New-England 
84 (Portsmouth, Daniel Fowle 1761). 
n* See id. 
120 An Act Prescribing the Forme of Writts for Possession, Scire Facias, and Replevin, ch. 3 
(1701), in 1 Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, supra note 114, at 461; see also 1 
Thomas Hutchinson, The History of the Colony and Province of Massachu- 
setts-Bay 376 (Lawrence Shaw Mayo ed., 1936) ("[The county courts] considered] real estates 
as mere bona, and they did not confine themselves to any rules of distribution then in use in Eng- 
land .... [These legal modifications were excusable] in a new plantation, where most people soon 
spent what little personal estate they had, in improvement upon their lands."). 
121 Phillips v. Dean, No. 16 (Ct. C.P. June 1720), in 5 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, 1686- 
1859, at 113 (David Thomas Konig ed., 1979), a 1720 court case in the Plymouth County, Massa- 
chusetts Court of Common Pleas, illustrates how the Massachusetts law functioned. Joseph Phil- 
lips successfully sued Thomas Dean on a book account debt for "Sadlary Ware" and received a 
judgment of eight pounds, ten shillings, and nine pence, plus court costs. The court issued a writ 
of execution for the sheriff to satisfy the debt. Three people were appointed to appraise Dean's 
land. The sheriff then put Phillips in possession of just over six acres of Dean's land. See id. 
Under the law, once Phillips recorded his interest in the county registry, he would have full legal 
title - a fee simple interest - to the real property. See also Executions Act, in ACTS AND LAWS 
of His Majesties Colony of Connecticut in New-England, supra note 117 (calling 
for transfer of land to creditor after appraisal). 
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"others happen[] to dye before they have discharged the same."122 The 
broader consequence of the 1692 law was that the inheritance of real 
property could no longer be viewed as an inevitable occurrence or a 
birthright: heirs took real property subject to the claims of all of their 
fathers' unsecured creditors. Land - the inheritance - could be 
taken involuntarily based on highly informal obligations such as book 
accounts123 without the participation of the heir and without the land- 
owner expressly executing a security agreement, a grant, or a will. 
The colonial laws described thus far implicitly reveal an important 
feature of imperial regulation within the British Empire prior to the 
Debt Recovery Act: lawmaking authority relating to debt collection 
and creditors' remedies was firmly vested in local colonial legislatures 
and courts. The Board of Trade and the Privy Council reviewed and 
modified colonial law to advance English economic interests.124 Par- 
liament, however, initially chose not to legislate directly in the realm of 
legal remedies and colonial court procedures. In resolving intercolo- 
nial disputes, the Privy Council and House of Lords, which had appel- 
late jurisdiction over litigation initiated in the colonies, applied not 
English law, but the relevant local colonial law. Colonial laws were 
overturned if they were found to be repugnant to the laws of England, 
but in the absence of such a ruling, colonial law prevailed.125 
B. Creditors' Remedies Against Slaves 
Prior to Parliamentary Regulation 
The legislative history of the Debt Recovery Act was shaped by 
concerns among English creditors to the colonies that the colonists 
122 1692 Land Liability Act, ch. 29, in 1 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra 
note 114, at 68. 
123 Book accounts functioned like a tab and were a popular form of unsecured debt through the 
mid-nineteenth century largely because of a dearth of cash currency. See Priest, supra note 7, at 
1328-30. 
124 A parliamentary Act of 1696, intended to improve the enforcement of mercantilist commer- 
cial regulations, provided that colonial "laws, by-laws, usages or customs" that were "any ways 
repugnant to" parliamentary laws regulating the colonies "are illegal, null and void, to all intents 
and purposes." 7 & 8 Wm. Ill, c. 22, § 9 (1696) (Eng.). The Board of Trade regularly issued for- 
mal Instructions to the colonial governors advising them on courses of action relating to local 
matters. Often these Instructions related to the economic interests of English creditors. See, e.g., 
Instructions cited supra notes 89, in. To my knowledge, the first systematic accounting of colo- 
nial laws found to conflict with English economic interests was contained in a 1734 Board of 
Trade Report, the purpose of which was to describe all colonial laws conflicting with English 
"TVade, Navigation, and Manufactures." M. BLADEN ET AL., REPRESENTATION OF THE 
Board of Trade Relating to the Laws Made, Manufacturers Set Up, and 
Trade Carried On, in His Majesty's Plantations in America (n.p. 1734) [hereinafter 
1734 BOARD OF TRADE REPORT]. For an overview of the mercantilist nature of English com- 
mercial regulations, see Priest, supra note 95, at 10-26. 
125 See, e.g., Meynell v. Moore, (1727) 4 Brown 103, no, 2 Eng. Rep. 70, 74 (H.L.) (applying 
Antiguan law). 
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were using English law to defeat their efforts to collect upon their co- 
lonial debts.126 The merchants were centrally interested in the laws of 
Virginia and Jamaica, where planters relied on an increasing supply of 
English credit to purchase slaves. The creditors' concerns related to 
slave property in two ways. First, colonies relying on slave labor to 
produce staple crops were more likely than colonies with smaller num- 
bers of slaves to retain the English protections to land and inheritance 
from unsecured creditors.127 English creditors' concerns about the im- 
pact of English property exemptions on debt collection were therefore 
relevant more often to colonies with large slave populations and to 
credit extended for slave purchases than to colonies with smaller slave 
populations, such as those in New England. Second, English creditors 
were concerned that colonial legislatures might enact laws characteriz- 
ing slaves as real property and thereby make the slaves legally immune 
from seizure by creditors. 
Why were colonies with greater slave populations more likely to re- 
tain English inheritance laws and to exempt real property from the 
claims of creditors? One explanation is that the owners of profitable 
colonial estates desired to replicate the features of the English legal re- 
gime that reduced short-term financial risk and allowed landowners to 
maintain the integrity of their plantations as productive enterprises 
over the long term. Landowners may have wanted to prevent the 
piecemeal dismantling of their estates - through, for example, the sei- 
zure of some or all of the slaves, or some of the assembled land - in 
order to prevent the interruption of the estates' operations and to re- 
tain the value that could be captured only when the land was assem- 
bled in its entirety.128 In a characteristic eighteenth-century account, a 
pamphleteer described a Barbados estate as "like a looking glass which 
when once broke to pieces will not fetch one quarter part of what it 
would when kept whole and entire."129 
126 See infra pp. 421-23. 
127 There are exceptions to this generalization: Barbados, for example, was a major slave col- 
ony that made land liable for debts. For an economic analysis of variation in colonial inheritance 
laws, see Lee J. Alston & Morton Owen Schapiro, Inheritance Laws Across Colonies: Causes and 
Consequences, 44 J. ECON. HIST. 277, 279-81 (1984). 
128 According to Pares, "[t]he colonial legislatures were . . . anxious to protect plantations from 
being pulled to pieces for small debts, or by reason of the scarcity of the currency." PARES, supra 
note 88, at 45. 
129 Id. at 46 (quoting John Ashley, The Fall of Barbados Since the French Edict in 1726, Public 
Records Office, Colonial Office Papers 28/25, A. a. 60) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
Pares describes a plantation in Jamaica that in 1802 was valued for sale at £21,212 in its entirety 
and at £14,351 if the buildings, lands, slaves, and equipment were sold separately. Id. at 88 n.55. 
One might ask, however, why Barbados and New England did not retain the English inheritance 
laws and other protections to land. Barbados is the principal exception to the general rule that 
colonies engaging primarily in staple crop production using slave labor maintained some version 
of English protections to land from creditors. One possible explanation is that Barbados was 
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As a general matter, however, the persistence of the English reme- 
dial regime in many colonies in the South and West Indies (and New 
York and Rhode Island) may have been a policy preference that their 
residents could afford because creditors would lend to them on the ba- 
sis of annual staple crop yields regardless of slaves. New England 
planters may have similarly feared that allowing execution on land for 
unsecured debts elevated their exposure to financial risk and could 
threaten the long-term productivity of farms, but the New England 
colonies had no equivalent staple crops for which they could obtain 
credit and suffered more severely from liquidity problems than the 
South.130 Most wealth in New England was held in the form of land: 
in 1774, 81.1% of New England wealth (capital goods) was in the form 
of land.131 By contrast, in the mid- Atlantic region, in 1774 land consti- 
tuted 68.5% of wealth; in the South, land constituted only 48.6% of 
wealth, and slaves constituted 35. 6%. 132 Abolishing the distinctions 
between real and personal property expanded credit to New England 
and increased the viability of using mortgages as "currency" in the ab- 
sence of other valuable chattel property that might serve as commodity 
money.133 Liquidity concerns were less serious in the South, where 
farmers produced staple crops that served as the basis for English 
credit and, locally, as commodity money, and where slaves were a 
highly valuable form of chattel property that had more of a presence 
than in the North. 
A second concern driving Parliament's enactment of the Debt Re- 
covery Act was that colonial legislatures might characterize slaves as 
characterized by absenteeism (its landowners often lived in England) and its landowners may 
therefore have been less attached to particular estates in land. By reforming their body of reme- 
dies, the Barbados planters signaled to creditors that the legal regime would protect creditors' 
interests. See JOHN J. McCusker & RUSSELL R. Menard, The ECONOMY OF BRITISH 
AMERICA, i 607-1 789, at 154-55 (1991). These landowners relied on large numbers of imported 
slaves purchased on credit (the Barbados slave population did not reproduce itself until the end of 
the eighteenth century) and borrowed money to finance more capital-intensive sugar refining than 
the other sugar colonies. See id. at 151-52, 164-67. Price and Menard speculate that Barbados's 
rapid development of the gang labor method of cultivation was related to its adoption of creditor- 
friendly remedies. See Price, supra note 12, passim; Menard, supra note 12, at 159-62. Why Bar- 
bados moved to this body of remedies so early is a complex question deserving further 
exploration. 
130 See Priest, supra note 7, at 1321-32. 
131 Marc Egnal, New World Economies 15 tbl.1.2 (1998); see also Alice Hanson 
Jones, Wealth of a Nation to Be 98 & tbl.4.5 (1980) (containing data underlying Egnal's 
table). 
132 EGNAL, supra note 131, at 14-15 & tbl.1.2; see also JONES, supra note 131, at 98 & tbl.4.5. 
133 G.B. Warden's study of Massachusetts mortgage markets found that land transferred hands 
so rapidly that the mortgages themselves likely constituted a form of currency. See G.B. Warden, 
The Distribution of Property in Boston, 16Q2-1775, 10 PERSP. Am. HIST. 81, 87-98 (1976); see 
generally Priest, supra note 7, at 1317-34 (describing "money substitutes" in light of currency 
shortages in New England). 
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real property and thereby make the slaves legally immune from seizure 
by creditors. From the moment slavery was instituted in the colonies, 
each colony with slaves had to address the issue of how to treat them 
within the traditional English property regime. Were slaves real prop- 
erty or personal property? 
This question was relevant both to credit conditions and to the eco- 
nomic impact of the English inheritance laws. The economic advan- 
tage to slaveholders of characterizing slaves as real property was that, 
under the inheritance practice of primogeniture, slaves and land would 
both descend to the eldest son at the death of a landowner. In con- 
trast, if slaves were characterized as chattel property, intestacy laws 
provided that the eldest son would inherit the real property, but not 
the slaves.134 Rather, younger children would inherit the slaves as 
chattel property, which was divided into equal shares after the de- 
ceased's debts were satisfied. Yet if the eldest son obtained the land 
but no slaves, the plantation might sit idle, potentially forever, while 
he gathered enough funds either to purchase his father's slaves from 
his siblings or to purchase new slaves. Thus, inherited land was of lit- 
tle value if slaves were personal property. 
Characterizing slaves as real property, however, diminished credit, 
and the need for credit overwhelmed the economic advantage of tying 
slaves to property. Slaves functioned as the primary collateral for 
debts among the wealthy in the Southern colonies. Slaves were valued 
as an investment in part because they could be sold to pay off debts 
more easily than could land.135 Yet if slaves were characterized as real 
estate, they would be protected entirely from the claims of unsecured 
creditors both during the life of the debtor and when his estate was 
distributed at his death. 
An additional threat to creditors was the problem described in 
Robert Carter's letter: money borrowed on an unsecured basis might 
be used to purchase slaves for the specific purpose of shielding wealth 
from the claims of creditors. In a slave economy, the effects on credit 
would be highly detrimental. As described in a 1727 Virginia statute, 
134 See Thomas D. Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law, 1619-1860, at 66 (1996). 
135 Richard Kilbourne, for example, observes: 
Slaves represented a huge store of highly liquid wealth that ensured the financial stabil- 
ity and viability of planting operations even after a succession of bad harvests, years of 
low prices, or both. Slave property clearly collateralized a variety of credit instruments 
and was by far the most liquid asset in most planter portfolios .... [A]n investment in 
slaves was a rational choice, given the alternatives for storing savings in the middle of 
the [nineteenth] century. 
Richard Holcombe Kilbourne, Jr., Debt, Investment, Slaves 5 (199s). Compare id. 
with Gavin Wright, Old South, New South 24-26, 30-31 (1986) (asserting that the large 
amount of wealth invested in slaves placed pressure on slave owners to put slaves to their most 
productive use, which led to high rates of geographic mobility). 
420 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:385 
"to bind the property of slaves, so as they may not be liable to the 
paiment of debts, must lessen, and in process of time, may destroy the 
credit of the country."136 
In order to secure slaves to the land they worked upon, Southern 
and Caribbean legislatures characterized slaves as real property, but 
often included special provisions making slaves a form of real estate 
that could be sold to satisfy debts to unsecured creditors, even in the 
event of the death of the debtor.137 As an example, the 1727 Virginia 
statute mentioned above characterized slaves as real property and au- 
thorized the practice of entailing slaves to particular parcels of real 
property. Entailing property would ordinarily make the property im- 
mune from seizure by a creditor. The 1727 act noted, however, that 
credit was usually extended on the basis of a debtor's visible property, 
and that "the greatest part of the visible estates of the inhabitants of 
this colony, doth generally consist of slaves."138 The statute therefore 
provided that even entailed slaves "shall be liable to be taken in execu- 
tion, and sold for the satisfying and paying the just debts of the tenant 
in tail," with the exception of those slaves allocated to the widow as 
dower.139 A 1731 Virginia opinion, Tucker v. Sweney,140 interpreted 
the statute in determining whether slaves born after the death of a 
debtor could be taken in execution to satisfy his debts. The judge de- 
termined that "Negroes notwithstanding the Act making them Real 
Estate remain in the Hands of the Ex'ors by that Act as Chatels and 
as such do vest in them for the payment of Debts So that in this Case 
136 An Act to Explain and Amend the Act, for Declaring the Negro, Mulatto, and Indian 
Slaves, Within This Dominion, To Be Real Estate, ch. 11, § 14 (1727), in 4 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, 
supra note 85, at 222, 226. 
137 A 1705 Virginia act, for example, stated that: 
For the better settling and preservation of estates ... all negro, mulatto, and Indian 
slaves, in all courts of judicature, . . . shall be held ... to be real estate (and not chattels;) 
and shall descend unto the heirs and widows of persons departing this life, according to 
the manner and custom of land of inheritance, held in fee simple. 
An Act Declaring the Negro, Mulatto, and Indian Slaves Within This Dominion, To Be Real Es- 
tate, ch. 23, pmbl., § 2 (1705), in 3 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 85, at 333, 333. A later section 
clarified that, notwithstanding the treatment of real property for the purpose of inheritance, 
"slaves shall be liable to the paiment of debts, and may be taken by execution, for that end, as 
other chattels or personal estate may be." Id. § 4, at 334. Antiguan law was similar in that slaves, 
but not freehold estates, were liable for the satisfaction of unsecured debts. On the Antiguan legal 
regime, see Meynell v. Moore, (1727) 4 Brown 103, 2 Eng. Rep. 70 (H.L.). 
138 An Act To Explain and Amend the Act, for Declaring the Negro, Mulatto, and Indian 
Slaves, Within This Dominion, To Be Real Estate ch. 11, § 14, at 226. 
139 Id. § 15, at 226. The Act's primary purpose was "to preserve slaves for the use and benefit 
of such persons to whom lands and tenements shall descend ... for the better improvement of the 
same." Id. § 11, at 224. 
140 Jeff. 5 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1731). 
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they are considered no otherwise than Horses or Cattle."141 The Vir- 
ginia law is typical of the laws in other American and West Indian 
colonies.142 Some colonial legislatures, however, characterized slaves 
as real estate despite the negative impact that such laws might have 
had on credit. As described below, Jamaican lower courts were not 
permitted to authorize seizure of slaves.143 In most colonies relying 
heavily on slave labor, however, unsecured creditors could claim debt- 
ors' chattel property and slaves, but not their land. 
C. The Enactment of the Debt Recovery Act 
i. A Perceived Need for Greater Parliamentary Regulation of Co- 
lonial Property. - Although colonial legislatures initially defined the 
debt collection procedures administered by the courts, their power to 
legislate in this area was subject to the review and control of English 
imperial authorities.144 In the late 1720s and the 1730s, a sharp de- 
cline in the prices of sugar and tobacco and general conditions of re- 
cession throughout the Atlantic economy transformed the relationship 
between the colonial legislatures and the imperial authorities.145 Large 
numbers of colonial planters were unable to pay their debts to English 
factors and merchants. Such depressed economic conditions made 
creditors' remedies a central issue in imperial politics. 
The Debt Recovery Act responded in particular to actions of the 
Virginian and Jamaican legislatures. Concern about Virginia emerged 
in 1727 when, in response to an Instruction from England, Governor 
Gooch requested that the Virginia legislature enact a law allowing 
English creditors to seize the land of debtors who had formally de- 
clared bankruptcy in England.146 The legislature failed to provide the 
requested remedy. It tried to placate the imperial authorities with a 
law reaffirming that slaves would be available to satisfy debts.147 
English creditors then complained to the Board of Trade about a 1705 
Virginia law establishing a three- to five-year statute of limitations 
141 Id. at 5. As the historian Thomas Morris notes, the judge in this case overlooked the provi- 
sion of the Virginia statute requiring the exhaustion of personal property before slaves were to be 
sold. See MORRIS, supra note 134, at 70. 
142 See MORRIS, supra note 134, at 81-101. 
143 See infra p. 422. As mentioned above, in 1668 Barbados enacted a short-lived statute that 
characterized slaves as real estate exempt from creditors' claims. See supra p. 413. 
144 See supra p. 416. 
145 See Price, supra note 12, at 306 (describing the "abysmally low prices in Europe for both 
sugar and tobacco"). 
146 See id. at 308. The Instruction, which was given to most of the colonies, can be found in 1 
Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, supra note 89, at 338. 
147 See supra p. 420. 
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(depending on the type of debt) for bringing a suit against a debtor.148 
In 1730, the Crown repealed the Virginia statute of limitations by royal 
proclamation.149 The Virginia legislature enacted a new law to replace 
the 1705 law,150 but the new law purposefully omitted a provision of 
the 1705 law that had allowed an English creditor to prove his debts 
by swearing to them in England, "in the court of that county where he 
shall reside," or "before the governor or mayor of the place where he 
is."151 By failing to reenact this provision, the Virginia legislature im- 
plicitly changed the existing policy from one in which debts could be 
proved in England to one requiring English creditors to produce evi- 
dence in the local colonial courts. 
The complaints relating to Jamaica concerned what types of prop- 
erty would be available to satisfy creditors' claims. Jamaican law 
adopted a unique procedural hurdle for creditors wanting to force a 
seizure of debtors' land or slaves: the inferior common law courts were 
directed not to "intermeddle with or determine any actions whatsoever, 
where Titles of land or Negroes are concerned."152 To obtain remedies 
against these assets, creditors were required to seek relief in the Su- 
preme Court.153 In 1728, both houses of the Jamaican legislature 
passed a bill proposing a legal tender law to "oblige creditors to ac- 
cept ... the produce of the Island in payment of their debts" at a 
specified rate.154 Legal tender laws requiring creditors to accept goods 
at designated rates (often less than the market rate) were a popular 
form of debt relief legislation in the colonial era. The Governor re- 
fused to assent to the law but warned the Board of Trade that the leg- 
islature had approved the bill.155 
Then, in August 1731, several merchants in London petitioned the 
Crown to respond more generally to colonial acts and practices that 
148 See Price, supra note 12, at 308; see also An Act Declaring How Long Judgments, Bonds, 
Obligations, and Accounts Shall Be in Force, ch. 34 (1705), in 3 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 
85, at 377, 377-78. 
149 See 3 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 85, at 377 (noting repeal by proclamation in margin). 
The Board of Trade advised the Crown that the law conflicted with an English act that made 
rights created by judgment or by bond unlimited in time. See Price, supra note 12, at 308. 
150 See An Act for Ascertaining the Damage upon Protested Bills of Exchange, ch. 5 (1730), in 
4 Laws of Virginia, supra note 85, at 273. 
151 An Act Declaring How Long Judgments, Bonds, Obligations, and Accounts Shall Be in 
Force para. 9. 
152 An Act for Regulating Fees, Act 56, § 122 (1711), in 1 ACTS OF ASSEMBLY, PASSED IN 
the Island of Jamaica, supra note 87, at 86, 90. 
»S3 Id. 
154 Letter from Governor Hunter to the Council of Trade and Plantations (Aug. 3, 1728), in 36 
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1 728-1 729, 
No. 344, at 167, 168 (Cecil Headlam ed., Kraus 1964) (1937) (discussing the Act of July 18, 1728). 
155 Id. at 167-68. A petition to the Governor signed by thirty-five merchants and traders for- 
mally objected to the bill and explained "that it will injure the credit of the Island and ruin many 
of the inhabitants." Id. at 169. 
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they complained left them either "without any remedy for the recovery 
of their just debts" or with remedies that were "very partiall and pre- 
carious."156 In a subsequent memorandum detailing their concerns, 
the merchants complained specifically about the fact that land and 
houses were not liable for debts in Jamaica.157 A letter written by 
John Tymms, a Jamaican merchant, in September 1731, clarified that 
the need for a law subjecting real property to the claims of creditors 
derived from the fact that "[a]s it is, the principal parts of [Jamaican] 
estates are exempted by law from the payment of debts and negroes 
are frequently driven away into the woods or mountains out of the 
Marschall's way."158 Tymms added that "[t]his is an evil which pre- 
vents attempts at the better settlement of the island."159 
In response to the London merchants' petition, the Privy Council 
asked the Board of Trade to review the merchants' concerns and to 
advise the Crown on how to proceed. The Board of Trade Report 
emphasized the problems confronting creditors during the execution 
process because of the laws in some of the colonies, "particularly that 
of Jamaica, to exempt their Houses, Lands, and Tenements, and in 
some Places their Negroes also, from being extended for Debt."160 It 
advised the Crown of the need for a parliamentary act on remedies.161 
2. The Text of the Act - In 1732, Parliament enacted the Act for 
the More Easy Recovery of Debts in his Majesty's Plantations and 
Colonies in America.162 Its stated purpose was to "retriev[e] . . . the 
Credit formerly given ... to the Natives and Inhabitants of the 
. . . Plantations," and to "advanc[e] ... the Trade of this Kingdom."163 
The statute ensured English merchants that colonial legislatures would 
no longer be able to defeat debt collection efforts through application 
of English real property law. All forms of property were to be avail- 
able to satisfy any type of debt. Toward this end, beginning on Sep- 
tember 29, 1732, all "Houses, Lands, Negroes, and other Heredita- 
156 Petition of Several Merchants of the City of London (Aug. 12, 1731), in 38 CALENDAR OF 
State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1731, No. 3671, at 224, 225 
(Cecil Headlam & Arthur Percival Newton eds., Kraus 1964) (1938) [hereinafter 38 CALENDAR 
of State Papers], quoted in 1734 Board of Trade Report, supra note 124, at 7; see also 4 
Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North 
AMERICA 89, 128 n.13, 130, 153-54 (Leo Francis Stock ed., 2003) (referring to enactment of colo- 
nial statutes impeding the recovery of debts in parliamentary sessions of 1730 to 1732). 
157 See Particular Facts and Instances in Support of the Merchants' Petition (Aug. 12, 1731), in 
38 Calendar of State Papers, supra note 156, No. 4341, at 293. 
158 Letter from John Tymms to Humfrey Morice (Sept. 13, 1731), in 38 CALENDAR OF STATE 
PAPERS, supra note 156, No. 434H, at 294, 294. 
159 Id. at 295. 
160 1734 Board of Trade Report, supra note 124, at 9. 
161 Id. at 9-10. 
162 5 Geo. 2,c. 7(i732)(Eng.). 
163 Id. pmbl. 
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ments and real Estates" were to be liable for "all just Debts, Duties 
and Demands, of what Nature or Kind soever."164 These property in- 
terests - houses, lands, slaves, and others - were to be "Assets for 
the Satisfaction" of debts "in like Manner as Real Estates are by the 
Law of England liable to the Satisfaction of Debts due by Bond or 
other Specialty."165 This provision of the statute clarified that the 1691 
Statute of Fraudulent Devises - which gave secured creditors priority 
to a deceased's land over the heirs and devisees - applied throughout 
the American and West Indian colonies both to secured creditors and 
to unsecured creditors.166 
The Debt Recovery Act also provided that houses, lands, and 
slaves would be "subject to the like Remedies . . . and Process" for seiz- 
ing and selling the same for "the Satisfaction of such Debts ... as Per- 
sonal Estates in the colonies were liable to for seizure and sale."167 In 
other words, the colonies were individually to use the same procedures 
for selling land and slaves to satisfy debts as were already in place for 
selling personal property. A separate provision of the statute was 
equally controversial to colonists: it provided that English merchants 
could prove their debts and obtain judgments against colonial debtors 
in English courts.168 
The Debt Recovery Act took from all of the British colonial legisla- 
tures in America and the West Indies the power to define categories of 
assets that would be protected from creditors' claims. Under the Act, 
all forms of wealth were available to satisfy unsecured debts. Notably, 
the statute was not limited to colonial debts to English creditors. The 
language of the statute required that colonial courts apply the Act lo- 
cally in all cases involving court awards in which enforcement of the 
judgment was required by means of execution.169 The Act applied 
only in the colonies, however; England retained its traditional real 
property exemptions for over a century after the enactment of the Debt 
Recovery Act, until 1833.170 
164 Id. § 4. Parliament at times responded to generalized fears of colonial debt relief legislation 
with sweeping statutes that were not responsive to local conditions. See, e.g., An Act To Prevent 
Paper Bills of Credit, Hereafter To Be Issued in Any of His Majesty's Colonies or Plantations in 
America, from Being Declared To Be Legal Tender, 4 Geo. 3, c. 34 (1764) (Eng.). 
165 5 Geo. 2, c. 7, § 4 (emphasis omitted). 
166 For a discussion of the Statute of Fraudulent Devises, see supra d. 404. 
167 5 Geo. 2,c. 7, §4- 
168 Colonists were incensed about this provision of the statute and believed it violated their 
right to defend themselves in court. This provision has an interesting history - some state courts 
repealed the provision during the American Revolution - but it is beyond the scope of this Arti- 
cle. See HEMPHILL, supra note 14, at 188, 227-28. 
169 5 Geo. 2, c. 7, § 4 (mandating that such property would be liable to all debts "owing by any 
such Person to his Majesty, or any of his Subjects"). 
170 See 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 104 (1833) (Eng.). 
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The context of empire provided English merchants with a unique 
political position: English merchants were able to represent their inter- 
ests to the Crown and Parliament in London with little input from the 
colonists. The primary participation by colonists in the process of en- 
acting the Debt Recovery Act was by Virginians, who fiercely opposed 
the Act. Prior to enactment, Virginia sent Isham Randolph as its agent 
to Parliament. Randolph submitted a petition to Parliament request- 
ing a hearing on the Act.171 Randolph's petition stated that "said bill 
will greatly affect the rights and propertys in the landed interest of his 
Majestys subjects residing in the said colony."172 Randolph received a 
hearing on March 17, 1731, and voiced his opposition to the statute, 
but his arguments failed to persuade Parliament. 
3. Political Reaction to the Act. - The Debt Recovery Act radi- 
cally changed the legal regulation of property in New York, Maryland, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Rhode Island, Antigua, Virginia (for 
approximately a decade), and, later, Georgia and Kentucky.173 The 
statute was recognized as authoritative throughout New England and 
Barbados, though the effects of the Act were more subtle in colonies 
that had already adopted similar laws independently. The Act did, 
however, have effects in New England. For example, New Hamp- 
shire's 1 7 18 law prevented the seizure of debtor's houses during the 
life of the debtor.174 The Debt Recovery Act explicitly includes houses 
in its list of property to be treated as legally equivalent to chattel prop- 
erty for the purpose of creditors' claims.175 In contrast, in Connecti- 
171 See Petition of Isham Randolph, Esq'r Agent for the Colony of Virginia (Mar. 17, 1731), 
quoted in 4 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENTS RESPECTING 
North America, supra note 156, at 153. 
172 Id. 
173 See, e.g., An Act for Rendering More Effectual the Laws Making Lands and Other Real 
Estates Liable to the Payment of Debts, ch. 4 (1764), in SESSION LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA 
(Wilmington, Andrew Steuart 1764) (stating that the Debt Recovery Act had been in effect and 
"many Lands and other real Estates . . . have accordingly been seized and sold ... as well in the 
Life-time of such Debtors, as after their Decease," and reaffirming that execution sales led to the 
transfer of the entire interest in the real property owned by the debtor); Peckham's v. Fryers (R.I. 
Eq. Ct. 1 741) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (holding that the Debt Recovery Act 
was in force in Rhode Island and applying the Act to disputes related to inheritance); Peckham's 
v. Allen (R.I. Eq. Ct. 1741) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (same); Writ of Execu- 
tion Against the Estate of William Harper, North Carolina State Archives (April 8, 1768) (on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library) (authorizing sheriffs to seize all forms of personal and real 
property in the following order until the debt was satisfied: first, personal property; second, slaves; 
third, land); Writ of Execution Against the Estate of Joseph Jennett, North Carolina State Ar- 
chives (June 4, 1767) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (same). 
174 See An Act for Making of Lands and Tenements Liable to the Payment of Debts (17 18), in 
Acts and Laws of His Majesty's Province of New Hampshire, in New-England, 
supra note 1 18, at 84. 
175 5 Geo 2, c. 7, § 4 (1732) (Eng.). For evidence that the Debt Recovery Act was recognized as 
authoritative in New Hampshire, see ACTS AND LAWS OF HIS MAJESTY'S PROVINCE OF 
New-Hampshire, In New-England iv, 233 (Portsmouth, Daniel & Robert Fowle 1771) (list- 
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cut, for example, the Act was perceived as simply providing more for- 
mal authority for the existing practice.176 
The Virginians - alone among the colonists - were immediately 
hostile to the statute. John Custis, Councillor of Virginia and a major 
planter (and Martha Washington's father-in-law before her first hus- 
band, Daniel Custis, died in 1757), referred to the statute as "cruell and 
unjust" in a letter to an English merchant.177 Custis explained that he 
personally owed "no one in England a farthing" and locally uha[d] 
many owing" him, so he had no economic motive in attacking the Act; 
his comments were "purely the result of [his] thoughts."178 He ex- 
pressed his astonishment that land could be sold to satisfy unsecured 
debts: 
[Y]our subjecting our Lands for book debts is contrary to ye Laws of our 
Mother Country; which cannot touch reall estate without a Specialty179 
and as wee are brittish Subjects wee might reasonably expect Brittish lib- 
erty wee desire nothing else than to bee subject to ye Laws of our Mother 
Country but wee have great reason to think you aim at our possessions 
who have got most of your possessions by us; ... and how ever you may 
flatter your selves to bee gainers by that act you will find yt you have so 
incensed ye Country; that you will force ym as soon as convenient to have 
nothing to do with you.180 
Similarly, Robert Carter, who had complained about the impact of 
the English property exemptions on his own efforts at debt collection 
in a 1720 letter,181 expressed concern about the Debt Recovery Act 
when it was enacted. Now President of the Virginia Council, he stated 
in a letter to a merchant in England that the "Severe act of Parliament 
. . . wearing the title, for the better Recovery of Debts . . . has rais'd so 
general a fury in the Assembly that hath carryed them into measures 
which I heartily wish from getting out of one extreme, we may not be 
involved in another."182 Carter stated that the "general crye" was that 
ing the Debt Recovery Act as one of the "perpetual laws" in operation in the colony and reprinting 
the law). 
176 Governor Talcott of Connecticut responded to the enactment of the Debt Recovery Act by 
stating that Connecticut courts would be "blameless in reassuming our former Rules, in putting 
the Administrator ... in the room and stead of the deceasd Debtor, to alienate his lands, for the 
payment of his just Debts." Letter from Governor Joseph Talcott to Francis Wilks (Oct. 1732), in 
4 Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society 260-61 (1892). 
177 Letter from John Custis to Thomas Lloyd (1732), quoted in HEMPHILL, supra note 14, at 
230. 
178 Idm 
179 "Specialty" is a term used to describe debts made under seal, or secured debts. 
180 HEMPHILL, supra note 14, at 230 (typeface altered for readability); see also Petition of 
Isham Randolph, Esq'r Agent for the Colony of Virginia, supra note 171. 
181 See supra p. 410. 
182 Letter from Robert Carter to Micajah Perry (July 10, 1732), quoted in HEMPHILL, supra 
note 14, at 228. 
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Virginians would rather "relye on the mercy of our Prince than ... be 
subjected to the tyranny of the merchants who are daily encreasing 
their Oppressions upon us."183 
Virginia initially complied with the Act. In 1738, the Virginia Gen- 
eral Court issued a decision holding that land could be "sold as Goods 
taken on a [fieri facias] "1S4 The court emphasized that this was the 
first instance of land being sold under the Debt Recovery Act.185 
Nonetheless, in 1748 Virginia appears to have reversed course and op- 
posed parliamentary authority by applying the Act only to debts in- 
volving English and Scottish creditors and not to internal debts.186 
D. The Impact in the Colonies of the Debt Recovery Act 
In 1774, William Knox, an English undersecretary of state in the 
American Department from 1770 to 1782, 187 attempted to convince co- 
lonial subjects that parliamentary regulation was in their best interests 
by describing the Debt Recovery Act as the primary source of colonial 
economic development. According to Knox, the economy of colonial 
British America grew more rapidly than those of the colonies of any 
other imperial power because of "the superior credit given to the 
planters by the English merchants."188 Why were British colonists 
given better credit by English merchants? To Knox, it was because 
the Debt Recovery Act "follow[s the merchants'] property, and secures 
it for them in the deepest recesses of the woods."189 Left alone, how- 
™ id. 
184 Harrison v. Halley, Jeff. 58, 58 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1739). 
185 id% 
186 The evidence is sparse on why Virginians decided to reject the Act internally. In 1748, how- 
ever, a proposal was submitted in the House of Burgesses to make the Debt Recovery Act in force 
with respect to internal Virginia affairs, and the proposal was rejected without comment. 
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 55-56 (Williamsburg, William Parks 1748) (reporting 
that the Committee of Propositions and Grievances rejected a proposition from the County of 
Richmond to make the Debt Recovery Act apply in Virginia). Yet also in 1 748, the Virginia legis- 
lature enacted a statute that explicitly adopted the traditional English approach to remedies (lim- 
iting the remedies to fieri facias for "goods[] and chattels," levari facias, and elegit). This statute 
thereby officially rejected the Debt Recovery Act with respect to intracolonial debts. An Act De- 
claring the Law Concerning Executions; and for Relief of Insolvent Debtors, ch. 12 (1748), in 4 
Laws of Virginia, supra note 85, at 526. 
187 Knox was influential in setting English policy for the colonies during the period. See Jack 
P. Greene, William Knox's Explanation for the American Revolution, 30 Wm. & MARY Q. 293, 
293 (J973) ("[FJew people in power in Britain thought more seriously or more deeply about the 
quarrel with the colonies at any stage of its development."). 
188 William Knox, The Interest of the Merchants and Manufacturers of 
Great Britain, in the Present Contest with the Colonies, Stated and Consid- 
ered 35 (Boston, Draper's 1775). 
189 Id. at 36. 
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ever, the colonial legislatures were likely to modify the laws to "injure 
their British creditors."190 
Knox asserted that the Jamaican protections to land and slaves 
from creditors were perfect examples of colonial legislatures' propen- 
sity to damage credit conditions. Parliament improved economic con- 
ditions by enacting the Debt Recovery Act, the effect of which he de- 
scribed as "subjecting lands and negroes in the Colonies to the 
payment of English book debts."191 The Act, Knox said, "may truly be 
called the Palladium of Colony credit, and the English merchants' 
grand security."192 Similarly, Joseph Story's Commentaries, describing 
American laws making land liable for debts, suggested that "the 
growth of the respective colonies was in no small degree affected by 
this circumstance."193 Were Knox and Story correct to describe the 
Debt Recovery Act as a source of colonial economic growth? 
1. Legal Effects of the Act in the Colonies. - In practice, the Act 
had three principal effects. First, the Act required colonial courts to 
treat all land, houses, and slaves as legally equivalent to chattel prop- 
erty for the purpose of satisfying the claims of unsecured creditors. 
Again, according to the language of the Act, "Houses, Lands, Negroes, 
and other Hereditaments and real Estates" were to be liable for "all 
just Debts, Duties and Demands, of what Nature or Kind soever."194 
The colonial courts implemented the Act by expanding the writ of fieri 
facias - which traditionally authorized the sheriff to seize the goods 
and chattels of a debtor - to authorize the seizure of land.195 
A debtor's land remained protected from creditors only in one 
sense: it was typically the last asset that the sheriff was permitted to 
seize under colonial writs of execution. As an example, the North 
Carolina writs of execution enacted after the Debt Recovery Act estab- 
lish a clear ranking of the types of property a sheriff could take to sat- 
isfy debts.196 The debtor's "Personal Estate . . . (Slaves Excepted)" 
was to be taken first. If that property was insufficient to satisfy the 
debt, then the debtor's "Personal Estate . . . including Slaves" was to 
190 Mat 37. 
191 Id. at 38. 
192 Id. (emphases added). Writing in 1774, Knox noted that some colonists were calling for a 
repeal of the Act, by which the colonists would "ruin their trade and fortunes with their own 
hands." Id. For Knox, a repeal of the Act would not nearly be as damaging as what the colonists 
were also threatening: independence from all parliamentary authority. The patriots were the "as- 
sassins of the British merchant's security, and, by destroying their confidence in the Colonies, 
force them to withhold their credit, and thereby do the greatest injury to the Colonies them- 
selves." Id. at 42. 
193 1 STORY, supra note 1, § 182. 
194 5Geo. 2,c. 7, §4d732)(Eng.). 
195 See 4 KENT, supra note 14, at 428-31. 
196 See writs of execution cited supra note 173. 
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be taken.197 The sheriff was authorized to seize the debtor's "Lands, 
Tenements, Hereditaments and other real Estate" only if goods, chat- 
tels, and slaves were insufficient to satisfy the debt.198 This scheme 
was similar to that adopted in other colonies. 
Second, the Act subordinated the interests of heirs to those of unse- 
cured creditors at the death of a debtor.199 Many colonies interpreted 
the Debt Recovery Act as requiring a procedural modification whereby 
executors would be in charge of distributing a deceased's land as well 
as personal property. Under English law, the executor marshalled only 
the personal property of the deceased to satisfy his or her debts. The 
land automatically descended to the heir, unless the land was other- 
wise devised in the deceased's will.200 The Act, however, stated that 
colonial courts were to subject land to the same "Remedies . . . and 
Process . . . for seizing . . . [and] selling . . . [for] the Satisfaction of 
such Debts ... as Personal Estates."201 Thus, colonial courts had to 
address whether, under the Act, the executors would take control over 
the real property when landowners died. If so, the heirs and devisees 
would be vulnerable to executors' discretionary choices about how to 
satisfy the deceaseds' debts. Equally important, they would be denied 
the traditional procedural mechanism that afforded heirs and devisees 
the opportunity to defend their claims to inherited land in court.202 In 
an 1804 opinion, Chancellor James Kent stated that in New York, un- 
der the Debt Recovery Act, land was "to be treated exactly like per- 
sonal property; and it became usual to regard lands and real estates as 
assets in the hands of executors, and to cause them to be sold on exe- 
cution against executors."203 
Third, requiring that courts use the same procedures for selling 
land and slaves as they would for personal property meant that land 
and slaves would be sold at auction in most colonies. Selling land at 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
1Q9 As John Hay wood, a prominent North Carolina lawyer, stated in his argument in Baker v. 
Webb: 
Before the passing of this act lands could not be sold for the payment of debts, and the 
heir was not liable to the simple contract, or other debts of the ancestor in which he was 
not named: since the passing of this act they are liable to be sold, and in the hands of the 
heir are liable to all debts justly owing from the ancestor. 
Baker v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 43, 69 (Super. Ct. 1794) (Haywood arguing for the plaintiff). 
200 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 30, at 334 ("[T]he executor had nothing to do with 
the dead man's land, the heir had nothing to do with the chattels . . . ."). 
20i 5Geo. 2,c. 7, §4d732)(Eng.). 
202 As mentioned above, Blackstone described as an absolute right of property that no man 
shall be disinherited "unless he be duly brought to answer, and be forejudged by course of law." 1 
BLACKSTONE, s«/>ra note 2, at * 134-35. 
203 Waters v. Stewart, 1 Cai. Cas. 47, 71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804); see also 4 KENT, supra note 
14, at 429 (listing states that allowed land to be sold on a writ of fieri facias with no right of 
redemption). 
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auction, however, raised the additional issue of whether traditional 
debtor redemption rights to land would be recognized after the sale. 
The statute explicitly stated that "Houses, Lands, Negroes, and other 
Hereditaments and real Estates" were subject to the Act.204 Redemp- 
tion rights were interests in real property that most courts interpreted 
as being covered by the Act, and therefore subject to sale at an execu- 
tion auction. As described in Bell v. Hill,205 a 1794 North Carolina 
Superior Court opinion: 
[I]f a [fieri facias] issues upon a subsequent judgment, and comes to the 
hand of the Sheriff, and he sells the lands, the title of the vendee under 
such execution cannot ever afterwards be defeated - it is valid to every 
purpose. [] Were the law not so, it would be the most dangerous thing in 
the world to purchase lands at an execution sale.206 
Nonetheless, it was possible for judges to interpret the Debt Recov- 
ery Act as applying only to proceedings at law. The Act did not ex- 
plicitly state that it applied to proceedings in equity. Equity courts, 
where they existed,207 could have found that the Act did not apply to 
their proceedings and that, therefore, they were entitled to recognize 
traditional English redemption rights.208 But colonial equity courts 
faced a problem: when law courts, such as the North Carolina court in 
Bell v. Hill, determined that all interests in real property were sold 
during an auction of real property at law, then on what basis could 
equity courts hold that some real property interest (the equitable re- 
demption right) remained in the mortgagor after such a sale? The is- 
sue had never emerged in England because real property could not be 
sold pursuant to a legal writ of fieri facias . As the next Part describes, 
in most colonies (and later, states) the Debt Recovery Act led to the 
abolition of equitable redemption rights.209 The Act therefore made it 
easier for both secured creditors and unsecured creditors to use legal 
process to obtain satisfaction of their debts. 
204 5 Geo. 2, c. 7, § 4 (emphasis added). 
205 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 72 (Super. Ct. 1794). 
206 Id. at 95; see also Waters, 1 Cai. Cas. at 70-71; 4 KENT, supra note 14, at 429. 
207 At the time of the Revolution, only Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
South Carolina had established separate equity courts. See Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law 
in Colonial America: Controversies over Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Cen- 
tury, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 263-64 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 
197 1 ). After the American Revolution, several other states either established equity courts, or 
granted full equity powers to common law courts. These included Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. See 
Marylynn Salmon, Women and the Law of Property in Early America 82-83 
(1986). 
208 This argument was made (unsuccessfully) by lawyers in an 1804 New York case heard by 
the New York Supreme Court. See infra pp. 444-45. 
209 See infra section III. A, pp. 440-47. 
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Slaves had been used as collateral and had been sold in judicially 
supervised auctions long before Parliament enacted the Debt Recovery 
Act. The Act, however, transformed local practice, which could be 
overturned by legislation, into an imperial mandate. In 1806, in the 
first known pamphlet on slave auctions, Bryan Edwards, a Member 
of the House of Commons, describes the practice of auctioning slaves 
to satisfy the slave owner's secured and unsecured debts as a grievance 
"so remorseless and tyrannical in its principle, and so dreadful in its 
effects," which, "though not originally created, is now upheld and con- 
firmed by a British act of parliament."210 Edwards says of the Act: "It 
was an act procured by, and passed for the benefit of British creditors; 
and I blush to add, that its motive and origin have sanctioned the 
measure, even in the opinion of men who are among the loudest of the 
declaimers against slavery and the slave trade."211 After describing the 
horrors of the slave auction and the fact that the practice of selling 
slaves at auction to satisfy debts "unhappily . . . occurs every day," 
Edwards states: "Let this statute then be totally repealed. It is injuri- 
ous to the national character; it is disgraceful to humanity. Let the ne- 
groes be attached to the land, and sold with it."212 
Despite this outcry, the reality was that, in America, the provisions 
of the Act that required courts to treat slaves as chattel property had 
little additional effect because colonial legislation already required 
courts to treat slaves as chattel for the purpose of satisfying debts.213 
The Act's principal effect with regard to slaves was to eliminate the 
possibility that the colonial legislatures might reform their laws and al- 
low slaves to be protected from seizure for debts. 
2. Risks Eliminated by the Act. - The legislative history suggests 
that the Debt Recovery Act was enacted to eliminate three principal 
risks facing creditors to the colonies. First, the presence of English 
property exemptions meant that all unsecured creditors assumed the 
risk that their debtors might purchase land strategically to reduce the 
pool of assets from which the creditors could collect. Actions of this 
nature represent a form of moral hazard in which a debtor increases 
210 2 Bryan Edwards, The History of the British Colonies in the West Indies 
366 (Phila., James Humphreys 1806). Thomas Russell, the modern scholar most knowledgeable 
about American slave auctions, identifies the Edwards essay as the earliest known writing on the 
frequency of slave auctions. See Thomas D. Russell, A New Image of the Slave Auction: An Em- 
pirical Look at the Role of Law in Slave Sales and a Conceptual Reevaluation of Slave Property, 
18 CARDOZO L. REV. 473, 481 (1996) (conducting an empirical analysis of slave auctions in ante- 
bellum South Carolina and finding that courts conducted or supervised a majority of slave 
auctions). 
211 2 EDWARDS, supra note 210, at 366. 
212 Id. at 367-68. Parliament repealed the Debt Recovery Act with respect to slaves in the re- 
maining British colonies in 1797. See 37 Geo. 3, c. 119 (1797) (Eng.). 
213 See supra pp. 420-21. 
432 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:385 
the risks faced by a creditor after the credit has been extended. Robert 
Carter, it may be recalled, complained of a debtor who had purchased 
land after becoming fatally ill in order "to defraud his creditors, and to 
do something for his wife and children at other men's cost."214 The 
Debt Recovery Act abolished all exemptions that allowed for such 
strategic behavior. 
The second risk the Act sought to eliminate was more specific to 
colonies, such as Jamaica and Virginia, where planters relied exten- 
sively on credit to purchase slaves. This was the risk that debtors 
might conceal their slave and other chattel assets from the officials 
who came to collect on behalf of creditors. When the land was im- 
mune from seizure, debtors were able to prevent their creditors from 
having any effective collection remedy. The merchant John Tymms, 
for example, complained that "the principal parts of [Jamaican] estates 
are exempted by law from the payment of debts and negroes are fre- 
quently driven away into the woods or mountains out of the Mar- 
schalPs way."215 Making land available to satisfy the claims of unse- 
cured creditors eliminated debtors' incentives to conceal slave and 
chattel property from their creditors. In colonies heavily reliant on 
slave labor, the Debt Recovery Act likely led to greater seizure of 
slaves for debt satisfaction purposes. 
The third risk eliminated by the Act was the risk that colonial leg- 
islatures might enact debt relief legislation that would hurt creditors' 
interests. The Act created greater security both by overriding specific 
colonial laws that protected assets or inheritance from creditors and by 
removing colonial legislatures' legal authority over creditors' remedies 
and debt collection processes. By enacting a broad uniform rule, ap- 
plicable throughout all of the British colonies in America and the West 
Indies, the English forestalled such legislation.216 
3. Economic Effects of the Act. - By eliminating the risks de- 
scribed above, the Act lowered the costs to creditors of obtaining a le- 
gal remedy when debtors defaulted on their debts. Moreover, under 
the traditional English remedies, an unsecured creditor who, say, ap- 
plied for a writ of levari facias to impose a lien upon earnings of a 
debtor's land might have had to wait years for the debt to be paid off. 
In contrast, under the regime of the Debt Recovery Act, a creditor 
could use legal process to force a sale of all of a debtor's real and per- 
214 Letter from Robert Carter to John Carter, supra note 90, at 33. 
215 Letter from John Tymms to Humfrey Morice, supra note 158, at 294. 
216 Eliminating the risk of subsequent colonial legislation applied to all colonies, including 
those, such as Barbados and Massachusetts, that had voluntarily reformed their laws to make 
land available for debts prior to the Debt Recovery Act. 
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sonal property in a short period of time either during the debtor's life 
or after the debtor died.217 
In addition, as described, English equity court procedures imposed 
costs on mortgagees seizing real property upon default of a mortgage 
agreement. Abolishing rights of redemption vastly reduced the costs 
secured creditors faced in forcing a seizure of debtors' land.218 On the 
margin, a creditor is likely to pass on the costs of collection to the 
debtor in the form of higher interest rates. The principal economic ef- 
fects of the Debt Recovery Act were likely to be lower interest rates on 
both secured and unsecured credit219 and expanded land markets. 
Empirical studies of property exemptions have found a clear corre- 
lation between more expansive exemption laws and higher rates of in- 
terest. A recent study by Jeremy Berkowitz and Michelle J. White, for 
example, found that in states with unlimited homestead exemptions, 
interest rates on loans to small unincorporated firms were higher and 
these firms were more likely to be denied credit.220 Other studies have 
found similar results.221 
Lower interest rates would mean that more capital was available 
for productive investment. The precise economic effect of eliminating 
all property exemptions is complicated, however, by the fact that some 
debtors are more likely to borrow more - despite having to pay 
higher interest rates - when at least part of their assets are "insured" 
217 In the works that have discussed potential economic implications of the Debt Recovery Act, 
Menard and Price emphasize the acceleration of legal relief as a central effect. See Menard, supra 
note 12, at 159-61; Price, supra note 12, at 294. 
218 It is important to note that the Debt Recovery Act affected both secured and unsecured 
credit because the interplay between secured credit and unsecured credit is complex. A law per- 
mitting an unsecured creditor to seize real property has significance only if some value remains in 
the property beyond the amount owed on the mortgage. Conversely, if all property is mortgaged 
to the extent of its full value, a law permitting unsecured creditors to seize real property is irrele- 
vant. Moreover, the exemption of real property from the claims of all unsecured creditors might 
benefit secured creditors by clarifying that only secured creditors have the right under law to seize 
that property. See Jeremy Berkowitz & Richard Hynes, Bankruptcy Exemptions and the Market 
for Mortgage Loans, 42 J.L. & ECON. 809 (1999) (demonstrating the importance of the distinction 
between secured and unsecured credit for bankruptcies that fund home mortgages). Thus, in 
America, both secured credit and unsecured credit were transformed during the colonial period. 
The total amount of credit extended in the society was therefore likely to have expanded, irrespec- 
tive of the allocation between secured and unsecured credit. 
219 Menard describes lower interest rates as an effect of the Debt Recovery Act. Menard, supra 
note 12, at 1 6 1 . 
220 Jeremy Berkowitz & Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy and Small Firms' Access to Credit, 35 
RAND J. ECON. 69, 78, 80-81 (2004). 
221 See Reint Gropp et al., Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand, 112 QJ. 
ECON. 217 (1997) (finding worse credit terms in states with higher property exemptions); Emily Y. 
Lin & Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy and the Market for Mortgage and Home Improvement 
Loans, 50 J. URB. ECON. 138, 160-61 (2001) (finding that interest rates on mortgages are higher 
in jurisdictions offering exemptions on property from the claims of unsecured creditors). 
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against seizure by creditors.222 These effects are different for relatively 
low- versus high-risk borrowers. Lower interest rates increase de- 
mand for credit by low- risk borrowers despite the greater availability 
of assets for debt collection. In contrast, enhanced collection remedies 
make borrowing riskier for high-risk borrowers. 
Did the Debt Recovery Act in fact improve credit markets in the 
colonies? The clearest example of the Act's economic effect is a statute 
enacted in 1739 in Jamaica that explicitly responded to the Act. The 
Jamaican statute lowered the legal interest rate by twenty percent.223 
It stated that "[w]hereas by an act of parliament . . . entitled, 'An act 
for the more easy recovery of debts in his majesty's plantations and 
colonies in America/ creditors in the colonies are secured [in] their 
debts in a more ample manner than when interest was established in 
this island at [ten percent per year]," it was appropriate that in all 
"mortgages, bonds, and other specialities" that the legal interest rate be 
reduced to "eight pounds for the forbearance of one hundred pounds 
for a year."224 A twenty percent decline in the interest rate - spread 
out over thousands of secured transactions - would have had signifi- 
cant effects on imports and credit available for productive investment. 
The Jamaican usury law is strong evidence that contemporaries be- 
lieved the Debt Recovery Act "secured [creditors'] debts in a more am- 
ple manner," but statutes establishing maximum legal rates of interest 
were not always complied with when the legal interest rate differed 
substantially from the market interest rate. Moreover, in the colonial 
period, "interest rates" were likely to be expressed most often in terms 
of import levels. When creditors felt more secure about repayment, 
they would allow colonists to import more goods on the basis of the 
annual crop yields, and perhaps for longer terms.225 Pinpointing the 
precise economic effect of the Debt Recovery Act is difficult by means 
of economic growth data or data on imports to the colonies, however, 
because economic trends such as import levels were affected by many 
222 Wei Fan and Michelle J. White found that the probability of owning an unincorporated 
business is higher in states that offer higher property exemptions. Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, 
Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of Entrepreneurial Activity, 46 J.L. & ECON. 543 (2003); see 
also Frederick Link, The Economics of Personal Bankruptcy 155 (May 3, 2004) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library) (finding that higher homestead exemption levels lower the probability that a household 
owns a home; lower the probability that a household will have positive non-mortgage debt; but 
increase homeowners' levels of mortgage debt). 
223 An Act for the Reducing the Interest of Money on All Future Contracts, and for the Ad- 
vancing the Credit of Bills of Exchange, ch. 3 (1739), in 1 LAWS OF JAMAICA 262 (St. Jago de la 
Vega, Alexander Aikman 1792). 
224 Id. pmbl., at 262-63. 
225 English creditors sold goods to colonial factors that the factors, in turn, sold to local colonial 
producers on credit for extended periods of time. See, e.g., SHERIDAN, supra note 13, at 284 (dis- 
cussing the role of colonial factors); Priest, supra note 95, at 18-19 (same). 
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different variables. These variables included conditions in the English 
and European markets for goods like tobacco, wheat, and rice; crop 
production, which depends on weather; productivity advances; and 
equally important, economic events in England, Europe, and Africa. 
Moreover, the Act was enacted during a period of economic recession, 
so the immediate economic effects are difficult to disaggregate from 
the growth one would expect in the aftermath of a recession. It is well 
known, however, that a period of great colonial economic expansion, 
driven by credit, began in the 1740s. The terms upon which credit 
was extended appear to have improved considerably in the period af- 
ter the enactment of the Debt Recovery Act, as reported in studies not 
addressing the Act. For example, the economic historian Marc Egnal 
has examined advertisements in the Virginia Gazette and found that 
"[i]n the 1730s the typical advertisement for land or slaves demanded 
payment in cash."226 By the 1760s, similar advertisements offered 
credit terms of a year or more.227 Egnal adds that "[statistical series 
and planter correspondence illustrate the strong growth of credit after 
the 1 740s."228 Customs records reveal that imports to the colonies 
from England increased steadily from the 1730s and 1740s through the 
end of the colonial period.229 The colonies, for example, imported 
from England approximately £530,000 (pounds Sterling) in goods in 
1732, the year that the Debt Recovery Act was enacted, but over dou- 
ble that amount, approximately £1,230,000, by 1749.230 Over this pe- 
riod, colonial factors became willing to accept bills of exchange drawn 
for longer periods of time.231 The terms of trade - the quantity of an 
imported good that could be purchased with a given unit of a colonial 
good - improved dramatically during the same period.232 These im- 
ports led to increases in the standard of living and what historians 
such as T.H. Breen have referred to as a "consumer revolution" and an 
"empire of goods" by the 1750s.233 
226 See EGNAL, supra note 131, at 93. 
227 Id. at 93 fig.5.12. 
228 Id. at 93. 
229 2 Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Historical Statistics of 
the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, at 1176 (1975) [hereinafter 2 Historical 
STATISTICS]; see also EGNAL, supra note 131, at 83 fig.5.6 (graph of per capita imports). 
230 2 Historical Statistics, supra note 229, at 1176. 
231 See Sheridan, supra note 13, at 290. 
232 See MCCUSKER & MENARD, supra note 129, at 68 ("The final thirty years of the colonial 
era were marked by a major improvement in the terms of trade as prices for American staples 
rose more rapidly than those for British manufactures."). 
233 T.H. Breen, The Marketplace of Revolution xv (2004); see also Richard L. 
Bushman, The Refinement of America (1992) (describing transformation of consumer 
culture and standard of living beginning in 1740s). 
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Slave imports expanded during the same period.234 Although im- 
port levels and credit terms to the colonies were determined by many 
different economic factors, data on this expansion of slave imports in 
Virginia provides the best evidence of an immediate and direct effect 
of the enactment of the Debt Recovery Act in 1732. Virginia was a 
colony that, prior to the Act, maintained the traditional English regime 
of protecting real property (although not slaves) from unsecured credi- 
tors. And Virginia's laws were noted along with those of Jamaica as a 
concern by the English merchants petitioning Parliament for the Act. 
Slave imports to Virginia equaled 276 in 1730 and 184 in 1731; rising 
to 1,291 in 1732; and, in the years following, from 1733 to 1737, the 
numbers rose to 1,720, 1,587, 2,104, 3,222, and 2,174, respectively.235 
These data are not conclusive evidence that the Debt Recovery Act 
had important economic effects on colonial America, but they are sug- 
gestive of the effects.236 
The Debt Recovery Act also likely expanded the market for land in 
America, although this result is also difficult to measure. With respect 
to both unsecured and secured credit, courts in America could order 
judicial sales of real property (or in New England, in-kind transfers to 
creditors) with far greater ease. These court-ordered sales meant that 
more land was placed into circulation. 
Foreclosure sales would not, however, represent the full extent of 
the impact of the Act on property markets. When the law offers all 
creditors the remedy of judicial sales of debtors' property, debtors are 
likely to be far more willing to sell the land, or some part of it, to sat- 
isfy their debts in advance of such sales. Indeed, one would expect 
that, in most instances, debtors who owned real property would choose 
to sell separately to pay off creditors or to settle with their creditors 
outside of the court system, rather than to endure a foreclosure sale. 
By selling separately or settling with creditors, debtors would avoid 
expensive court costs, lawyers' fees, and other transaction costs in the 
court-ordered auction process.237 Changing the default rule to one 
234 See EGNAL, supra note 131, at 100-01 (showing the increase in slave imports into Charles- 
ton, South Carolina). 
235 2 Historical Statistics, supra note 229, at 1172 tbls.146-49. 
236 In a brief discussion of the Debt Recovery Act, Price speculates that "the credit-based slave 
trade in many colonies could and did expand significantly in the ensuing decades" after the Act 
became effective. Price, supra note 12, at 310. Price notes that slave imports to Virginia were 
"buoyant" following the Act. Id. at 310 n.36. 
237 Colonial court fees were high. An empirical study of court fees and costs of court in litiga- 
tion in 1740 in the Plymouth County, Massachusetts, Court of Common Pleas found that fees and 
costs totaled 79% of the underlying debt amount for the lowest quartile of debts, and averaged 
32.6% of all debts. Claire Priest, Colonial Courts and Secured Credit: Early American Commer- 
cial Litigation and Shays' Rebellion, 108 YALE L.J. 2413, 2426 tbl.i (1999). The full impact of a 
law making real property available to satisfy unsecured debts will, therefore, not be reflected in 
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permitting unsecured creditors to seize land would lead to an increase 
in voluntary property sales. 
4. The Question of Entailed Land. - Measuring the precise effects 
of the Debt Recovery Act on credit markets and on land markets is 
further complicated, however, by the fact that the Act did not disrupt 
landowners' ability to entail their property voluntarily and did not af- 
fect widows' dower interests in lands owned by their husbands. Land 
that was entailed could not be sold or seized by court order because 
such a sale would have conflicted with the interests of the remainder- 
men.238 The Act did not change the effect of entailing land. It re- 
quired that courts throughout the colonies treat landowners' real prop- 
erty interests as they would chattel property. The Act would therefore 
have required courts to sell the possessory life interests of tenants in 
tail to satisfy their debts, as they would their chattel property. The in- 
terest sold would be a tenancy for the duration of the life of the debtor. 
Unfortunately, historical scholarship is ambiguous as to the extent 
and importance of the entail during the colonial period.239 It is possi- 
ble to imagine that the Act would have led to an expansion of the 
practice in some contexts and a contraction of the practice in others. 
Because the Act abolished other traditional protections to land from 
creditors' claims, the entail remained the central means by which 
landowners could protect their land from creditors during the colonial 
period. Landowners who wanted to safeguard their real property from 
financial risk - at the expense of creditors - would have had greater 
incentive to make use of the entail after the Act abolished other tradi- 
tional protections on land. Those landowners who wanted greater 
credit, however, would have chosen not to entail their property. In- 
deed, creditors would have been likely to demand that their debtors 
remove the entail prior to extending credit on the basis of landed 
wealth. The practice of entailing property in various colonies requires 
further study. 
E. The Debt Recovery Act and the Politics of Empire 
The Debt Recovery Act was an important parliamentary regulation 
of internal colonial affairs. The English viewed the Act as exemplify- 
ing the economic advantage of parliamentary oversight of colonial leg- 
islation. As the colonists became increasingly hostile toward parlia- 
mentary regulation and taxation during the 1760s, the question 
emerged as to how to interpret the Debt Recovery Act as a precedent. 
the absolute number of judicially ordered foreclosure sales. Foreclosure sales are likely to repre- 
sent only a small percentage of land sold to satisfy creditors' claims. 
238 As described above, when estates were entailed, the present possessor held only a life inter- 
est - the right to full possessory use for the duration of the party's life. See supra p. 400. 
239 See supra note 25. 
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The Stamp Act was resented, in part, because it represented taxation 
upon internal colonial matters and did not merely regulate external 
trade, which colonists accepted as within the scope of parliamentary 
authority. In a 1765 pamphlet responding to the Stamp Act crisis, Wil- 
liam Knox argued that the Debt Recovery Act had severely impinged 
upon central liberties inherent in English common and statutory 
law.240 Knox's motive was to make the Stamp Act seem less interven- 
tionist by comparison. According to Knox: 
[The Debt Recovery Act] abrogates so much of the common law as relates 
to descents of freeholds in America, takes from the son the right of inheri- 
tance in the lands the crown had granted to the father, and his heirs in ab- 
solute fee, makes them assets, and applies them to the payment of debts 
and accounts contracted by the father without the participation of the son 
.... [T]he power of parliament having been exercised to take away the 
lands of the people in America, (the most sacred part of any man's prop- 
erty) and dispose of them for the use of private persons, inhabitants of 
Great Britain, [who can] question the parliament's having sufficient juris- 
diction to take away a small part of the products of those lands, and apply 
it to the public service?241 
Alexander Hamilton later reflected upon the Debt Recovery Act as 
an exercise of parliamentary power that exceeded the bounds of legis- 
lative authority to which the colonists should have submitted. In his 
Practice Manual of the early 1780s (a manual he drafted on the opera- 
tion of legal process in New York State, and the first legal treatise of 
American state law), Hamilton states: 
The English [fieri facias] affected only Chattels[,] ours the Real Estate 
equally; this Extension of it was by Act of Parliament of Geo: 2d. particu- 
larly made for this Country, a memorable Statute & which Admitted more 
240 See William Knox, The Claim of the Colonies to an Exception from 
Internal Taxes Imposed by Authority of Parliament (London, W. Johnston 1765). 
Knox owned large amounts of property in Georgia, a state directly affected by the Debt Recovery 
Act, so he had some practical basis for understanding the impact of the law. 
241 Id. at io-ii. Daniel Dulaney, a private citizen from Maryland, wrote a pamphlet attacking 
the Stamp Act in response to Knox's defense of it. See DANIEL DULANEY, CONSIDERATIONS 
on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies, for the Purpose 
OF RAISING A REVENUE BY ACT OF PARLIAMENT (Annapolis, Jonas Green 1765). In re- 
sponse to Knox, Dulaney minimized the impact of the Debt Recovery Act, stating that its princi- 
pal effect was only to "subject Real Estates to the Payment of Debts after the Death of the 
Debtor" and to ensure that colonial legislatures did not characterize slaves as real property which 
"very considerably diminished the personal Fund, liable to all Debts." Id. at 37. To Dulaney, 
"[t]his was, without Doubt, a Subject upon which the Superintendence of the Mother-Country 
might be justly exercised; it being relative to her Trade and Navigation, upon which her Wealth 
and her Power depend." Id. Dulaney's dismissal of the Act's importance, however, is contradic- 
tory. If the Act only affected inheritance proceedings, and if that change in the laws had as little 
impact as Dulaney suggests, then why did characterizing slaves as real property damage credit? 
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then our Legislature ought to have assented to; it was one of the Highest 
Acts of Legislature that one Country could exercise over another.242 
It appears that Hamilton intended to emphasize that the Debt Re- 
covery Act was a regrettable precedent for parliamentary regulation: 
it might have empowered Parliament to enact the offensive statutes 
leading to the American Revolution (such as the Stamp Act and the 
Townshend Act). His description of the Debt Recovery Act as "one of 
the Highest Acts of Legislature," however, also reveals the importance 
placed upon creditors' remedies as a matter of economic, social, and 
political concern in the founding era. As we shall see, the states were 
highly protective of their right to legislate in the area of creditors' 
remedies and were unwilling to cede authority to the federal govern- 
ment in the way that the colonies had, through tacit acceptance, ceded 
authority to Parliament and the Board of Trade in the colonial era. At 
the Constitutional Convention, James Madison proposed giving the 
federal government the power to veto state legislation on the parlia- 
mentary model.243 The Convention ultimately rejected the model of 
routine parliamentary supervision, and the United States Constitution 
limited federal government oversight of state legislation on commercial 
matters principally to the Contracts Clause and the Commerce Clause. 
In opposition to the imperial model, the states retained firm control 
over their debt satisfaction and property exemption policies. 
The next Part discusses the extension of the Debt Recovery Act by 
state legislatures and in state court decisions in the founding era. It 
then discusses the implications of the Act and the issue of creditor 
remedies for American federalism. 
III. Defining the Role of Land and Inheritance 
in Founding-Era America 
The Debt Recovery Act brought greater uniformity to the body of 
creditor remedies enforced throughout the British colonies in America 
and the West Indies. After the colonists gained independence from 
British parliamentary authority, however, state legislatures and courts 
faced a choice when enacting laws in areas previously covered by the 
Act. The policies governing creditors' remedies, inheritance practices, 
and judicial process were related to deeper issues about the nature of 
242 Alexander Hamilton, Practical Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the State of New York 
(circa 1782), in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 55, 97 (Julius Goebel, Jr. 
ed., 1964) (emphasis added). 
243 See Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for Federalism: Madison s Negative and the TYansi- 
tion from Imperial to Federal Supremacy (Dec. 12, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the Harvard Law School Library) (describing the Madisonian veto proposal and identifying its 
failure in the Constitutional Convention as an explicit rejection of the English model of Privy 
Council review). 
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the society as a whole. The founding era was a period in which 
landed wealth still played a large role in many people's conceptions of 
the economic, social, and political order.244 At the time of the Revolu- 
tion, every state but one required freehold property ownership for par- 
ticipation in the franchise based upon the belief that real property 
ownership conferred an independence from corrupt influences neces- 
sary for political participation and led to the strongest form of attach- 
ment to the nation.245 A 1776 pamphlet, for example, concluded that 
Americans were particularly well suited for republicanism because 
they were "a people of property; almost every man is a freeholder."246 
Contemporaries viewed the issues at hand as involving the defini- 
tion of the role of real property in the society: Was land simply a form 
of wealth like other chattel property? If not, to what extent should 
government policy isolate land from commercial risks? What was the 
proper role of inheritance in post-Revolutionary America? Without a 
parliamentary mandate, the context in which states enacted laws per- 
taining to property and the claims of creditors became increasingly 
complex. Each state had to decide how to balance the desire for credit 
and economic advancement with the competing desire to safeguard the 
landowners' "independence" and families' financial security. State 
policies and court decisions in the 1780s and afterward reveal a perva- 
sive lack of uniformity among the states and their constituents in their 
understanding of the most desirable economic and inheritance policies. 
These differences among the states became a powerful barrier to 
strong federal government authority. 
A. The Extension of the Debt Recovery Act 
in State Legislation and Court Decisions 
The Debt Recovery Act had a lasting legacy in founding-era Amer- 
ica. It was incorporated by many state legislatures and courts into the 
newly created state law. Its extension in these states reflected two 
dominant concerns: First, after the states gained their independence, 
the state legislatures, viewing themselves as in competition for credit, 
were eager to signal to outside investors that they would promote the 
interests of creditors and investors. Second, state judges and legisla- 
tors were influenced by one of the dominant ideological positions of 
the founding era - referred to here as the "commercial republican" 
view - which emphasized the importance of the expansion of com- 
244 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
245 See Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 335, 339-40 (1989); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 14, at 66-69 (discussing the civic re- 
publican view of property as a socializing force). 
246 WOOD, supra note 20, at 234 (quoting PA. PACKET, Nov. 26, 1776; S.C. & Am. GAZETTE, 
Nov. 6, 1777) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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merce to the creation of an American meritocracy. According to this 
view, the new American republican order contrasted sharply with the 
English aristocracy, which based social and political privilege upon 
land ownership and inheritance. Commercial republicans defended 
the policy of making land available to satisfy debts and the stream- 
lined nature of legal process under the Debt Recovery Act on the 
ground that subjecting landed wealth to commercial risks would pre- 
vent the entrenchment of a domestic aristocracy. 
Most state legislatures enacted statutes affirming that the remedial 
regime existing prior to the American Revolution would remain in 
place without substantial modification.247 Indeed, the early state legis- 
lation was even more explicit than analogous colonial legislation that 
its purpose was to signal to creditors that the state's real property law 
offered few opportunities for debtors to shield assets from creditors' 
claims. A North Carolina statute of 1777 that extended the Debt Re- 
covery Act, for example, stated that it was directed toward "divers 
Persons residing in other States or Governments [who] contract Debts 
with the Inhabitants of this State," and that "by the Policy and Genius 
of our present Constitution, Lands and Tenements ought to be made 
subject to the Payment of just Debts, when the Debtor hath not within 
the Limits of this State Goods and Chattels sufficient to satisfy the 
same."248 
The abolition of the practice of entailing property in the 1780s was 
another means by which state legislatures attempted to improve the 
terms of credit offered to the newly independent states.249 By abolish- 
247 In some states, the Debt Recovery Act remained valid law. For example, a New Hampshire 
judicial opinion of 1828 concluded that the Debt Recovery Act "is still the law of the land here at 
this day." Pritchard v. Brown, 4 N.H. 397, 404 (1828). The Act also remained enacted law in the 
parts of Washington, D.C., that Maryland had ceded to create the territory. See Suckley's Adm'r 
v. Rotchford, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 60, 67 (1855) ("It ... is fully shown by numerous adjudged cases in 
the Court of appeals of Maryland, that the statute 5 George 2, ch. 7, § 4, was in force in that state 
February 27th, 1801, when their laws were extended by act of congress to Washington county; 
and was in force in Washington county June 24th, 181 2, when the law of that county was ex- 
tended to Alexandria county."). 
248 An Act for Establishing Courts of Law, and for Regulating the Proceedings Therein, ch. 2, 
§ 29 (1777), in Acts of Assembly of the State of North Carolina 8, 16 (Newbern, 
James Davis 1778); see also Act of Feb. 15, 1791, 1791 N.H. Laws 122 (establishing a regime 
whereby lands would be transferred to creditors in kind, with a one-year statutory redemption 
period, when a debtor's personal property was deficient). 
249 See GA. CONST, of 1777, art. 51, explained by An Act To Explain the Fifty-First Article of 
the Constitution, Respecting Intestate Estates; and also Concerning Marriages, No. 307 (1785), in 
Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia 313 (Robert Watkins & George Watkins 
eds., Phila., R. Aitken 1800); An Act Concerning Wills; the Distribution of Intestates Estates; and 
the Duties of Executor and Administrators, ch. 61, § 25 (1785), in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; 
Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia 140, 146 (William Waller Hening ed., 
Phila., Thomas Desilver 1823); see also GA. CONST, of 1789, art. 3, § 6, explained by An Act To 
Carry into Effect the Sixth Section of the Fourth Article of the Constitution, No. 429 (1789), in 
Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia, supra, at 414; An Act To Amend an Act 
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ing the entail, the state legislatures removed the principal remaining 
mechanism by which landowners could protect their real property as- 
sets from the claims of creditors in the era after the Debt Recovery 
Act. 
The enactment of new state statutes, however, invited litigation 
concerning how the courts would interpret the new statutory language. 
The most highly litigated issues under the state statutes that super- 
seded the Debt Recovery Act related to, first, the procedural issue of 
whether to extend heirs the privilege of being made parties to legal ac- 
tions in which the inheritance of land was at stake and, second, the 
status under the new state legislation of the mortgagor's equity of 
redemption.250 
Blackstone, it may be recalled, described as an "absolute" right of 
property that "no man shall be disinherited . . . unless he be duly 
brought to answer, and be forejudged by course of law."251 The issue 
of whether this traditional privilege would be recognized emerged re- 
peatedly in the founding era. State courts had to decide whether ex- 
ecutors of estates should be permitted to distribute real as well as per- 
sonal property to creditors without the formal participation of the heir. 
The issues involved are illustrated by D'Urphey v. Nelson,252 an 
1803 opinion of the Constitutional Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 
which unequivocally denied the traditional privilege in that state. 
D'Urphey brought an action as heir to his father's estate. His father's 
land had been sold by the lower court to satisfy one of his father's 
Passed at Hillsborough, ch. 435 (1795), in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 780 
(Hen. Potter, J.L. Taylor & Bart. Yancey eds., Raleigh, J. Gales 182 1) (dividing estate equally 
among sons and daughters); An Act To Regulate the Descent of Real Estates, To Do Away with 
Entails, To Make Provision for Widows, and Prevent Frauds in the Execution of Last Wills and 
Testaments, ch. 22, § 2 (1784), in 24 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 572, 572-73 (Wal- 
ter Clark ed., 1905) (dividing estate equally among sons); Intestates' Estate Act (1791), in 1 AN 
Alphabetical Digest of the Public Statute Law of South-Carolina 422 (Joseph 
Brevard ed., Charleston, John Hoff 1814). See generally 4 KENT, supra note 14, at 14-17 (de- 
scribing the entail as generally "abolished" in the United States). 
250 A less controversial issue involved whether the personal property had to be exhausted be- 
fore the sheriff seized the debtor's real property. Most states, either by statute or court decision, 
determined that, in the ordinary course of debt collection, the sheriff could seize land only when 
the debtor's personal property could not satisfy the debt. Maryland was exceptional in allowing 
creditors to choose whether to take the debtor's personal property or real property. See Hanson v. 
Barnes' Lessee, 3 G. & J. 359, 367 (Md. 1831) (noting that the Debt Recovery Act "stripped lands 
in the Plantations, of the sanctity with which they had been guarded, and by subjecting them to 
sale, no longer considered them as a secondary fund for the payment of debts in the hands of a 
debtor, but rendered them equally liable with his personalty. It is at the election of the plaintiff, 
whether he will seize lands or goods, and this has always been the construction of the stat- 
ute ... ." ). Statutes passed in New York in 1787 and 1801, see sources cited infra note 263, were 
more typical: they required courts to treat land exactly like personal property for the satisfaction 
of debts, but added the requirement that the personal property be exhausted first. 
251 1 Blackstone, supra note 2, at * 134-35. 
252 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 289 (S.C. Const. Ct. 1803). 
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bond debts. D'Urphey petitioned the South Carolina Constitutional 
Court of Appeals to hold void the deed of conveyance of the property 
issued by the sheriff on the ground that he had not been given an op- 
portunity to appear in court to contest the sale before the land was 
sold.253 
The Constitutional Court of Appeals, however, held that the Debt 
Recovery Act was still good law in South Carolina in 1803 and em- 
phasized that it required lands to be seized and sold "in like manner as 
personal estates ."2S4 According to the court, "the statute cannot be 
construed to make any distinction between lands and personal chattels, 
but they must be considered as equally liable for satisfaction of debts, 
and to be assets for that purpose in the hands of the personal represen- 
tatives of the debtor."255 It noted that the Debt Recovery Act was 
"certainly intended for the benefit of the creditor."256 More dramati- 
cally, the Court stated that due to the Debt Recovery Act: 
[T]he extreme anxiety observable in the common law of England to pre- 
serve the rights, and favor the claims, of the heir at law, has been entirely 
dismissed from our law. . . . And therefore there is no reason for giving no- 
tice to the heir . . . before issuing execution to seize and sell the land.257 
A second issue under the new state legislation involved the ques- 
tion of whether mortgagors retained the traditional equitable right of 
redemption after a judgment at law. In ten states, through 1820, the 
courts sold real estate at auction without recognizing any right of re- 
demption and without requiring that a minimum amount of the ap- 
praised value be obtained by means of the sale.258 Waters v. Stew- 
253 Id. at 290. 
254 id. at 291. 
255 Id. 
256 id. at 292. 
257 id. In an 1805 decision of the United States Supreme Court, Justice Marshall decided a 
case relating to Georgia law, holding that the Court had "received information as to the construc- 
tion given by the courts of Georgia to the statute of 5 Geo. 2. making lands in the colonies liable 
for debts, and are satisfied that they are considered as chargeable without making the heir a 
party." Telfair v. Stead's Ex'rs, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 407, 418 (1805). Kent notes that the same policy 
existed in Pennsylvania. 4 KENT, supra note 14, at 417. 
258 James Kent's treatise of 1830 states that the policy of affording no right of redemption was 
still in force in New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee, South Carolina, Georgia, Ala- 
bama, and Mississippi when he wrote. 4 KENT, supra note 14, at 426. New York followed the 
same policy until 182 1, when the legislature adopted a fifteen-month redemption period for land 
sold in execution sales. Id. at 427. Kent overlooked New Hampshire, where in 1828 the state's 
highest court held that the Debt Recovery Act - which was still in force - was properly inter- 
preted as requiring the sale of the equity of redemption with the real property at foreclosure sales. 
Pritchard v. Brown, 4 N.H. 397, 404 (1828). The court questioned whether the Debt Recovery 
Act necessarily implied that the equity of redemption should be sold but concluded that "this 
practice is of too long standing, and is the foundation of too many titles to be now questioned." 
Id. 
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art259 was a landmark case in this area.260 The facts in Waters are 
similar to the facts in D'Urphey. The appellants, Thomas Waters and 
his sister Sarah, were devisees of seventy acres of real property, subject 
to a mortgage, under their stepfather's will. They brought an action in 
chancery court to redeem the property by paying the remaining mort- 
gage debt. The equity of redemption, however, had been sold under 
the directive of a court of law to satisfy one of their stepfather's debts 
during the settlement of his estate. In the lower court's words, the is- 
sue at hand was "whether an equity of redemption in lands mortgaged 
in fee [was] subject to a sale [under] a fieri facias ."261 If the court of 
law lacked authority to sell the equity of redemption, then the sale 
would have been void and Waters and his sister would inherit the land 
and be able to redeem it from the mortgagee.262 
To decide the case, the court was required to interpret the language 
of a 1787 New York statute that superseded the Debt Recovery Act. 
The statute stated that "the lands, tenements, and real estate of every 
debtor shall be, and hereby are, made liable to be sold on execu- 
tion."263 At issue was whether the legislature intended to include equi- 
ties of redemption within the term "real estate," or whether the statute 
envisioned a regime more analogous to English practice, in which sei- 
zures of land could take place only after formal foreclosure proceed- 
ings in the equity courts. 
The lower court held for Stewart, the purchaser of the equity of re- 
demption in the court-ordered sale. According to the lower court, the 
Debt Recovery Act had "in its operation, so far as respected the inter- 
est of creditors, completely converted real into personal estate."264 The 
court disparagingly described traditional distinctions made between 
real and chattel property as "solicitude of the holders of landed estates, 
to perpetuate them within families, combined with the genius of the 
English government."265 The court noted, however, that the "collision 
between the landed and commercial interest being merely local, as 
confined to Great Britain, and not so extending to its colonies[,] . . . the 
same impediments did not present to the passing of the [statute] for the 
more easy recovery of debts in the colonies."266 It then noted that, 
since the enactment of the Debt Recovery Act, "sales of equities of re- 
259 1 Cai. Cas. 47 (N.Y. 1804). 
260 See 3 The Law Practice of Alexander Hamilton 638-44 (Julius Goebel, Jr. & Jo- 
seph H. Smith eds., 1980). 
261 Waters, 1 Cai. Cas. at 49-50. 
262 See id. at 68. 
263 Act of Mar. 19, 1787, ch. 56, 1787 N.Y. Laws 108; see also Act of Mar. 31, 1801, ch. 105, 
1 80 1 N.Y. Laws 388 (reenacting 1787 law). 
264 Waters, 1 Cai. Cas. at 52. 
26S id. 
266 Id. 
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demption have been uninterruptedly made."267 The court held that 
the language of the 1787 statute indicated the legislature's desire to 
continue the regime adopted under the Debt Recovery Act. 
Before the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York, Thomas and 
Sarah Waters argued that the equity of redemption was an interest 
that only had legal validity in the equity courts - courts of law in 
England did not recognize equitable redemption rights. They also ar- 
gued that without explicit legislative approval, such as by explicit in- 
clusion of "equitable interests" as interests to be sold at execution sales, 
only equity courts could authorize sale of or foreclosure upon interests 
that were simply not recognized as relevant to legal actions.268 
The court, however, upheld the decision of the lower court. With 
regard to the law, Chancellor Kent's opinion adopted the argument 
made by Alexander Hamilton and Josiah Hoffman, the lawyers for 
Stewart, who had purchased the land at the execution sale. It held 
that since mortgage law had evolved to treat a mortgage as simply a 
lien on land, rather than a title interest in land, the mortgagor should 
be treated as having a legal interest, subject to the remedies available 
in courts of law.269 Kent's opinion reasoned that the interest should 
therefore be viewed as "real estate" under the New York statute.270 
Kent noted that the New York statute at issue "adopted the same loose 
latitudinary terms as those in [the Debt Recovery Act]"271 and that 
"there can be no doubt, I think, but that an equity of redemption will 
be comprehended in the expression."272 
Kent's opinion also emphasized, however, two practical issues. 
First, it noted that courts of law had been selling land subject to mort- 
gages in execution sales since the Debt Recovery Act and stated that 
the "long and established practice in favour of such sales ... is of itself 
deserving of considerable weight."273 Kent also noted the importance 
of offering low-cost procedures to creditors. According to Kent, "if 
judgment creditors are under a necessity in every case of resorting to 
chancery, for leave to sell the land of the debtor, it would create double 
suits and double expense, and would lead to much inconvenience and 
delay."274 Kent emphasized that execution sales of real property were 
"agreeable to the general bent and spirit of the more modern deci- 
sions."275 Many other state legislatures enacted laws providing that 
267 Id. 
268 Sw id. at 54-55. 
269 See id. at 68-69. 
270 id. at 69. 
271 Id. at 71. 
272 Id. 
273 id. at 70. 
274 id. at 73. 
275 id. at 70. 
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land would be available to satisfy the landholder's debts, and state 
courts, in interpreting the new statutes, often came to conclusions simi- 
lar to Kent's.276 
North Carolina's state legislation and judicial decisions, such as 
D'Urphey and Waters, reflected a broader ideological position that as- 
serted that protections to real property from the claims of creditors 
were undesirable remnants of aristocratic England that had no place 
in republican America. It is notable that the judges in both the 
D'Urphey and Waters opinions felt compelled to state explicitly that 
the laws at issue purposefully rejected the value system of the English 
landed class that privileged heirs. In doing so, these judges related 
protecting creditors' interests and streamlining judicial process with 
dismantling the vestiges of feudalism (which historians have previously 
associated with the abolition of primogeniture and the entail). 
Over the years, the commercial republican position reinforced and 
extended this line of argument. In his famous Plymouth Oration of 
1820, Daniel Webster, for example, emphasized the abolition of tradi- 
tional protections to real property from creditors as an event that had 
pushed American society toward republicanism. In describing the ma- 
jor reforms of colonial law that had set the stage for democracy, Web- 
ster stated that "alienation of the land was every way facilitated, even 
to the subjecting of it to every species of debt."277 
As is reflected in these writings, the focus of the commercial repub- 
lican politicians was on using real property law to protect against 
landed "monopolies" and the aristocracy that emerged in association 
with concentrated landholdings, and also to ensure that debtor-creditor 
law did not privilege the landowning class at the expense of nonland- 
owners.278 It is interesting that there is no hint of concern relating to 
276 See, e.g., Ford v. Philpot, 5 H. & J. 312 (Md. 182 1) (holding, under the Debt Recovery Act 
and Maryland statutory law, that when a fee simple interest is sold at auction, the mortgagor re- 
tains no right to redeem); Ingersoll v. Sawyer, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 276 (1824) (holding that if a 
mortgagor does not redeem property sold at auction within the one-year statutory period, he loses 
his freehold); Bell v. Hill, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 72 (1794) (holding that whole interest may be sold at 
auction); see generally 4 KENT, supra note 14, at 426-27. 
277 Webster, Plymouth Discourse, supra note 26, at 72. 
278 Daniel Webster would likely have approved of the reform movement that developed in the 
1 82 os and 1830s that condemned the English regime as epitomizing the brutal injustice and aris- 
tocratic nature of England's criminal law, which protected landowners while imprisoning and 
impoverishing debtors who did not own land. According to Jeremy Bentham: 
[N]oble lords have been known to say . . . that for small debts . . . there ought to be no 
remedy. In pursuance of this same policy, property, in a shape which noble lords and 
honourable gentlemen have more of their property than in all other shapes put together, 
is exempted from the obligation of affording the satisfactive remedy - in a word, from 
the obligation of paying debts, while property in these other shapes is left subject to it. 
Noble lords or honourable gentlemen contract debts, and instead of paying them, lay out 
the money in the purchase of land: land being exempted from the obligation of being 
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the possibility that commerce might create inequalities of its own, ine- 
qualities that could influence, and potentially corrupt, politics. As 
Noah Webster stated in a 1787 pamphlet, "the inequalities introduced 
by commerce, are too fluctuating to endanger government."279 The 
commercial republican view narrowly focused on the belief that sub- 
jecting land ownership to the risks of commercial life would prevent 
the rule of an American aristocracy on the English model. 
B. Founding-Era Opposition to the Debt Recovery Act Regime 
The commercial republican position was highly contested by a sec- 
ond dominant ideological view of property exemptions. In the late 
1 780s, debtors' movements such as Shays 's Rebellion in Massachusetts 
led state legislatures to enact laws temporarily relieving debtors of the 
severity of the remedial regime that treated land as legally equivalent 
to chattel property.280 Some form of debt relief legislation was enacted 
in the 1780s in Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, North Carolina, and South Carolina.281 
The debt relief legislation of the 1780s expressed a sentiment that 
would gain greater force over time in American history: that the re- 
gime of the Debt Recovery Act subjected landowners to an undesirable 
level of financial risk. During times of economic recession, a great 
number of people were likely to experience the threat of losing their 
land and homes due to their inability to pay their debts. The loss, or 
potential loss, of a freehold estate in this period was a matter of serious 
social and political concern. 
Moreover, some state court judges were highly respectful of tradi- 
tional English legal distinctions between real and personal property. 
In Baker v. Webb,282 for example, the North Carolina Superior Court 
addressed the same issue as that of D'Urphey v. Nelson: did the heir 
have a right to be a party to a suit in which his landed inheritance 
might be sold to a creditor of his father? One of the judges stated that 
"[t]he whole weight of this labored case, seems reducible to this ques- 
sold for payment, creditors are thus cheated. Noble lord's son is too noble, honourable 
gentlemen's son too honourable to pay the money, but not so to keep the land. 
Jeremy Bentham, Justice and Codification Petitions 84-85 (Fred B. Rothman & 
Co. 1992) (1829). 
279 WEBSTER, supra note 3, at 47. 
280 See Robert J. Taylor, Western Massachusetts in the Revolution 105-20 
(1954); WARREN, supra note 14, at 147. For the economic context of Shays 's Rebellion, see Priest, 
supra note 237, at 2440-44. 
281 MANN, supra note 14, at 174-75; WARREN, supra note 14, at 147. These debt relief laws 
were typically either stay laws or legal tender laws. Stay laws literally "stayed" the process of exe- 
cution for a period of time, such as for a year. WARREN, supra note 14, at 146-48. Legal tender 
laws allowed debtors to satisfy their debts with either real property or chattel property of a lesser 
value than was explicitly contracted for. See supra p. 422. 
282 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 43 (Super. Ct. 1794). 
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tion, what is the true construction of the 5th Geo. II. ch.7. [the Debt 
Recovery Act]?"283 Did the Act abolish all distinctions between real 
and personal property, and therefore between law and equity? 
Unlike the judges in Waters v. Stewart and D'Urphey v. Nelson, the 
court in Baker held that the Debt Recovery Act was compatible with 
fundamental legal distinctions between real and personal property and 
between law and equity. The court held that, at the death of a land- 
owner, his real property immediately descended to the heir at law.284 
The land never came into the hands of the executor of the estate. The 
Debt Recovery Act had transformed the law to create a cause of action 
on behalf of the deceased's unsecured creditors against the heir with 
respect to inherited land. It did not, however, eliminate the traditional 
privilege of the heir to be a party to a lawsuit in which he might be 
denied his inheritance.285 
Baker v. Webb is interesting not only for interpreting the Debt Re- 
covery Act more conservatively than New York or South Carolina 
courts had. Haywood, the lawyer for the heir challenging the execu- 
tion sale of his father's land, framed the issue as implicating nothing 
less than the fundamental significance of landownership to American 
political life. Were traditional protections to land a relic of feudalism 
and aristocracy? Or, in contrast, were protections to land necessary to 
maintaining the independence and attachment of the citizenry and 
therefore equally essential to preserving a republican form of govern- 
ment? Speaking of the traditional privilege of heirs to be parties to 
proceedings in which their landed inheritance would be taken, 
Haywood contended: 
This rule is not any relick of the ancient feudal system. It is founded in 
the soundest policy, equally applicable to the condition of this country as 
to that of England .... The more freeholders there are . . . the greater is 
the public strength and respectability - and the method the law has 
taken to encrease their number, is by placing freehold property as far out 
of the reach of creditors as was consistent with that other maxim of justice 
and good policy, that all just debts ought to be paid when the debtor has 
any property wherewith to pay them. These we think are sufficient rea- 
283 Id. at7i(Macay,J.). 
284 See id. 
285 Judge Macay, for example, stated that: 
[The Debt Recovery Act] meant to provide for two things, the sale of lands for debts, 
and the making them liable to all just debts in the hands of the heir: and I am of opin- 
ion, that since the act of Geo. II. the same distinctions between real and personal prop- 
erty is [sic] to be kept up as before - and that lands, upon the death of an ancestor, de- 
scend to the heir, and personal chattels go to the executor as before; and lands in the 
hands of an heir, are no more to be affected by an action or judgment against the execu- 
tor, than the personal estate in the hands of an executor, are to be affected by a judg- 
ment against the heir: their interests are totally distinct and separate. 
Id. at 71. 
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sons for the preference the law has given real over personal property; and 
notwithstanding the construction contended for, I believe it has always 
been understood since the passing of this act, that the rule of law is so.286 
To Hay wood, heirs' traditional procedural privileges strengthened the 
republican nature of the society by increasing the likelihood that free- 
hold estates would descend through the generations. 
In contrast to North Carolina, where the Debt Recovery Act was 
given a qualified acceptance into the body of remedial law, the legisla- 
tures and courts in Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Delaware never fully 
implemented the Act. Indeed, Virginia rejected a proposal to reenact 
the Debt Recovery Act and instead maintained the traditional English 
remedial regime until 1849. 287 Pennsylvania and Delaware maintained 
the remedial regimes they had adopted in the colonial era: their policy 
was to sell a debtor's land at auction only if the judgment exceeded 
seven years of earnings of the debtor's real property. These policies 
remained good law through at least 1920 in Pennsylvania and through 
1925 in Delaware.288 In Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, the 
writ of elegit remained an important creditor remedy throughout the 
nineteenth century.289 
A second dominant ideological perspective, which might be re- 
ferred to as the Virginia position, gave support to the continued im- 
286 Baker, 2 N.C. at 54-55 (Haywood, J.). Haywood said further: 
That property which is deemed the most sacred, and is the best secured by law, becomes 
more than any other the object of attention, because it is the most permanent, and it is 
good policy to make that property most the object of attention, which the most effec- 
tually attaches its proprietor to the country he lives in, and real property possesses this 
quality more than any other. An industrious man, who by his labour has collected 
wherewithal to purchase him a little property, naturally fixes his attention on that which 
in all probability will continue the longest with his posterity, and which the law has ren- 
dered the most difficult to be taken from him - a freehold becomes his object, as well 
for the reasons above mentioned, as because the Constitution of the country has annexed 
to it certain privileges that advance him in the rank of citizenship; and as the freehold, 
when acquired, is incapable of being moved away like personal property when the dan- 
ger threatens or the State has occasion to call for personal or pecuniary aid, he is always 
ready to be called on, and to supply the emergencies of the commonwealth; when at the 
same time the holder of personal property, apprised of the services which the State 
needs, hath withdrawn both himself and his effects from the country, and possibly throw 
them into the scale of the enemy. 
Id. 
287 See VA. CODE ch. 186, § 9 (1849); Riesenfeld, supra note 14, at 712. 
288 Smith v. Ford, 161 A. 214 (Del. 1932), describes the history of Delaware and Pennsylvania 
laws making lands available to satisfy unsecured debts. See id. at 216-17. The first statute in 
Pennsylvania to substantially modify the regime enacted in 1705 was an 1836 statute allowing a 
landowner to waive his right to have his property subject to the writ of elegit and to allow it to be 
sold for debts worth less than seven years of earnings. Act of June 16, 1836, No. 191, 1836 Pa. 
Laws 755; see also Levy v. Spitz, 146 A. 548, 549 (Pa. 1929); 4 KENT, supra note 14, at 428. 
289 In a case heard by the Delaware Court of Chancery, for example, a tenant by elegit failed to 
rotate crops according to customary practice. See Wilds v. Layton, 1 Del. Ch. 226 (1822). The 
court relied on the waste doctrine to enjoin him from using any method other than the rotating 
three-fields system of tilling the land. Id. at 229. 
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plementation of the old English regime, but without the concentrated 
landholdings that resulted from primogeniture. This position reflected 
a world view reminiscent of the English perspective that land was a 
natural family endowment and ideally a source of family prosperity 
through the generations. Hay wood's argument, described above, 
claimed that protections from creditors increased the number of free- 
holders in the society.290 
Thomas Jefferson's statements on debt suggest that he opposed the 
regime enacted under the Debt Recovery Act. His views are famously 
expressed in his 1789 letter to Madison, in which he claimed that it is 
self-evident that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."291 A few 
lines down, he explained the comment by stating that: 
[N]o man can, by natural right, oblige the lands he occupied, or the per- 
sons who succeed him in that occupation, to the paiment of debts con- 
tracted by him. For if he could, he might, during his own life, eat up the 
usufruct of the lands for several generations to come, and then the lands 
would belong to the dead, and not to the living, which would be the re- 
verse of our principle.292 
The theory of property expressed in Jefferson's comment reveals 
his assumption that real property, at least according to "natural right," 
involved not just the fee simple ownership of one person, but also the 
claims of family members. It is particularly striking that Jefferson 
chose to use the term "usufruct" (a right to use property and to trans- 
mit it to the next possessor in substantially the same state) in the 
course of describing an individual's relation to his land. Americans in 
the founding era typically viewed American republicanism as rooted in 
the country's unique attribute of having widespread freehold owner- 
ship. Usufructuary rights have more in common with the traditional 
English approach toward real property, in which a dominant mode of 
ownership, often formalized by the strict settlement, was a life tenancy 
(with the remainder held in trust). Stating that a property owner vio- 
lated his heirs' natural rights to property when he incurred debts that 
might "eat up" his heirs' interests and treated the land as though it 
"belonged" entirely to him was antithetical to the commercial republi- 
can fee simple world view. The commercial republican view was that 
the right of the living freehold owner was total and included the right 
290 It was possible, of course, to value freehold property ownership as a prerequisite to political 
participation and to defend laws subjecting real property to the claims of all unsecured creditors. 
For example, in the 1820s, Daniel Webster simultaneously attacked the English laws exempting 
property from creditors' claims and defended the proposition that government representation 
should be structured so that property owners exercised political power in proportion to the 
amount of property they owned. See Webster, supra note 26, at 97-101. 
291 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
292 Id. at 393 (footnotes omitted). 
2oo6] CREATING AN AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 45 I 
to alienate the property or to incur debts on the basis of the owner's 
real property holdings. James Kent, for example, viewed America as 
distinct from England in its rejection of the societal dependence on in- 
heritance.293 As Kent remarked in his treatise, "[ejvery family, 
stripped of artificial supports, is obliged, in this country, to repose 
upon the virtue of its descendants for the perpetuity of its fame."294 
Jefferson's statement that the "earth belongs in usufruct to the living" 
is thus deeply conservative. 
Thomas Jefferson's comment that no natural right permits burden- 
ing the family property with debts, although derived from English 
conceptions of natural law, might also be viewed as an intellectual de- 
velopment emerging after more than fifty-five years under the regime 
of the Debt Recovery Act. Virginia planters, under the Act, had ex- 
perienced decades of a legal alternative to the English regime. Jeffer- 
son opposed primogeniture on the grounds that it led to an aristocracy 
and, therefore, an aristocratic form of government.295 But his letter to 
Madison suggests a desire to defend Virginia's policy of retaining 
the safeguards to real property of the old English feudal order. Pro- 
tecting the land from creditors gave fee simple owners the independ- 
ence, virtue, and loyalty to government necessary for participation in a 
republic. 
The "commercial republican" and "Virginia" positions were not 
held universally in any one state. Indeed, some Virginians opposed 
Virginia's body of laws on grounds that its property exemptions were 
economically detrimental. One Virginian's letter of November 14, 
1787, published under the name "A True Friend," argued that Vir- 
ginia's protection of land from creditors harmed Virginians and the 
Virginia economy.296 The author suggested that Parliament's role in 
monitoring colonial legislatures to advance English economic interests 
was crucial to Virginia's economic development, and he expressed fear 
about the absence of Parliament as a check on local legislatures.297 
293 See 4 KENT, supra note 14, at 18. 
294 Id. at 27. 
295 Jefferson described the abolition of primogeniture as necessary to destroy "every fibre ... of 
ancient or future aristocracy" as the basis of "a foundation ... for a government truly republican." 
Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, 1 743-1 790, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1, 
68 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., N.Y., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1892); see also A Bill Concerning Wills; the 
Distribution of Intestate's Estates; and the Duty of Executors and Administrators, in 2 THE PA- 
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 394 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) (describing the process for settling 
deceaseds' estates); A Bill Directing the Course of Descents, in 2 The PAPERS OF THOMAS JEF- 
FERSON, supra, at 391 (abolishing primogeniture). 
296 See A True Friend, To the Inhabitants of Virginia, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Nov. 14, 1787, re- 
printed in 8 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 
159 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1988). 
297 Id. at 161-64. 
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According to the letter, Virginians remained "in the chains of Brit- 
ish slavery"298 because state laws protecting land drove capital else- 
where, even though "[w]e have the best mortgage to offer, which is 
immense and fruitful lands."299 Thus: 
[Virginians] have enjoyed none of the great advantages, which independ- 
ence promised us .... For this axiom is certain, nothing is lent those that 
have nothing, and credit is offered, at its lowest rate, to those that offer the 
best securities. Therefore as long as the law will subsist in Virginia that 
the creditor cannot seize, lay attachment and sell the land of his debtor, at 
the epoch the debt fall due, it is as we had nothing, and as long as it will 
be by the tediousness of the courts of justice almost impossible to force the 
debtor, we shall not find money lenders, none but usurers will offer, that 
will ruin us. - Specie of course will turn its course towards other states 
that will have better and more political laws. 
America (and principally Virginia) is of necessity a borrower. The ex- 
tent of her lands which demand great advances to grub them up, her 
commerce just rising of which the first funds ought to be laid, and her 
manufactures of chief wants which ought to be established, require assis- 
tance and credit. When we were under the tuition of Great-Britain, she 
presided over our laws, and in a manner digested them. We could pass no 
act tending to hurt, or annihilate the rights and interests of British credi- 
tors; consequently they did not fear to advance considerable sums, on 
which they drew an annual interest higher than the rate in England, be- 
sides the profits arising from a trade in which the balance was always in 
their favor, and which has brought us five millions of pounds sterling in 
their debt. Those services and advances, though so dearly bought, were 
however indispensable, and augmented in a greater proportion the mass of 
the produce of population, and of our territorial riches. By running in 
debt with the mother country, America increased really in power. We may 
from thence judge how much more rapid and prodigious her progress 
would be, was she, (as she might) by her union and unanimity, to purchase 
at this moment her assistance cheaper, and in a way less burdensome for 
her. It would be then only she would enjoy the advantages of her liberty 
and of her independence.300 
As this letter suggests, the economic implications of rejecting the 
principles of the Debt Recovery Act were perceived to be severe. 
C. Property Exemptions and Federalism 
The issue of exempting land from creditors' claims was debated in 
relation to national, as well as local, policy. The Debt Recovery Act 
model, of course, was one of a uniform imperial policy toward prop- 
erty exemptions determined at the highest levels of legislative author- 
298 Id. at 1 60. 
299 Id. at 161. 
300 Id. 
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ity. Ceding responsibility over creditors' remedies to the state legisla- 
tures reflected both a rejection of the parliamentary model of central- 
ized control and a recognition of the economic and cultural discrepan- 
cies between the states. In the new American system, not only did 
states retain legislative authority over their own court procedures and 
remedial regimes, but the states also insisted that the federal courts 
recognize and implement the local state execution processes in the 
cases that they decided.301 In 1790, President George Washington 
advised Congress to consider "whether an uniform process of execu- 
tion, on sentences issuing from the Federal courts, be not desirable 
through all the States."302 But opposition to a federal policy was 
strong enough that a federal remedial policy was not enacted for much 
of the nineteenth century, meaning that the federal courts were re- 
quired to implement the relevant state remedies in federal court 
litigation.303 
The question whether land would be available to satisfy unsecured 
debts emerged with respect to two other issues of national policy. One 
issue was what policy should apply to the Northwest Territory. Con- 
gress adopted Pennsylvania's policy of allowing sale of the debtor's 
property only if the debt exceeded seven years of the property's earn- 
ings.304 This policy choice might be viewed as a rejection of the prin- 
ciples of the Debt Recovery Act and as a furtherance of the desire to 
use property exemptions and reduced financial risks to attract immi- 
grants to frontier areas. 
The issue of whether land would be available to satisfy debts was 
also central to the debates over the nation's first bankruptcy legisla- 
tion. Under all of the proposed legislation, a bankrupt's lands would 
be seized and sold as a condition of obtaining a fresh start. As early as 
1792, Thomas Jefferson questioned the desirability of a federal policy 
involving "seizing and selling lands." He noted that "[h]itherto, we 
had imagined the General Government could not meddle with the title 
to lands."305 He emphasized that bankruptcy legislation providing for 
the seizure of land was suited for a commercial or mercantile society, 
but not for one based on agriculture. He asked: 
Is Commerce so much the basis of the existence of the U.S. as to call for a 
bankrupt law? On the contrary are we not almost merely agricultural? 
301 See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93; Charles Warren, Federal Process and State Leg- 
islation, 16 VA. L. REV. 42 1, 426-30 (1930). 
302 2 annals of Cong. 1730(1790). 
303 See Warren, supra note 301 (describing the use of state remedies in the federal courts 
through the first half of the nineteenth century). 
304 See A Law Subjecting Real Estate to Execution for Debt (1795), in The LAWS OF THE 
NORTHWEST TERRITORY, 1 788-1 800, at 131 (Theodore Calvin Pease ed., 1925). 
305 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph, Jr. (Dec. 21, 1792), in 24 THE 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 775 (John Catanzariti ed., 1990). 
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Should not all laws be made with a view essentially to the husbandman? 
When laws are wanting for particular descriptions of other callings, should 
not the husbandman be carefully excepted from their operation, and pre- 
served under that of the general system only, which general system is fit- 
ted to the condition of the husbandman?306 
In the debates over the Bankruptcy Bill of 1798 (the first bank- 
ruptcy bill that was seriously considered), the Federalists (commercial 
republicans), however, were dedicated to the new order of minimal 
property exemptions in which credit terms were improved to promote 
economic development. For example, James A. Bayard, a young Fed- 
eralist, described state law making land immune from the payment of 
debts as "a remnant of the feudal system, of the principle of the an- 
cient aristocracy of England, which was imported hither from that 
country by our ancestors."307 To Bayard, the "principle goes to the 
root of commercial credit; because a merchant must know, that if he 
gives credit to a large amount, that the whole of that money may be 
vested in land by his debtor, and then he cannot touch it. ... Com- 
merce, and a law like this, cannot live and flourish on the same 
soil."308 The Republicans, in contrast, wanted a general exemption 
from the statute for all agrarian debtors. Albert Gallatin, the most 
prominent Republican in Congress, argued that protections on real 
property, such as Virginia or Pennsylvania's limitation on execution 
sales to debts larger than seven years' worth of earnings, were neces- 
sary "in order to prevent the sacrificing of land at a rate so much be- 
low its value as it must sometimes be sold for, if it were always liable 
to be sold for debt, as personal property."309 
A Bankruptcy Act allowing execution against a bankrupt's land 
was enacted in April of 1800, but it was repealed three years later un- 
der the Jefferson administration.310 Tension between states over prop- 
erty exemptions was a central reason for the failure of bankruptcy leg- 
islation for much of the nineteenth century.311 
Subsequent history saw a building up of protections to real prop- 
erty. Over the course of the nineteenth century, economic recessions 
were routinely followed by law reform movements that expanded pro- 
306 Thoughts on the Bankruptcy Bill (circa Dec. 10, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 305, at 722. For a more detailed discussion of Jefferson's views on 
bankruptcy legislation, see MANN, supra note 14, at 196-98. 
307 9 Annals of Cong. 2660(1799). 
308 Id 
3°9 Id. at 2651. 
310 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 533-34 (Joseph Gales ed., 1851); WARREN, supra note 14, at 19-20. 
311 See Cole, supra note 14, at 230, 242-46 (describing variation in property exemption laws in 
colonial and founding-era America, recognized under nineteenth-century bankruptcy statutes, as 
evidence of the "federalist character" of early bankruptcy policy). 
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tections for debtors' assets from the claims of creditors.312 It is notable 
that, in the 1820s, as politicians like Webster were extolling the virtues 
of the laws that made real property more alienable to creditors as es- 
sential features of the new republican meritocracy, the popularity of 
the Federalist/commercial republican position on this issue was waning 
on a widespread basis throughout America. The preference for prop- 
erty exemptions was increasing among those who believed that sub- 
jecting all forms of property to commercial risk jeopardized democracy 
- or at least the livelihoods of families within the democracy - by 
creating conditions in which a mere economic downturn might lead a 
family to be forced out of the landowning class and into the ranks of 
the indigent. 
During the early nineteenth century, state legislatures enacted laws 
exempting various types of personal property from the claims of credi- 
tors.313 The first major wave of reform laws, however, consisted of 
enactments in the aftermath of the recession of 1817 to 1818.314 In 
those years, many states enacted more temporary stays on execution as 
well as "appraisal laws," which required that land only be sold if the 
price obtained constituted a specified percentage (say two-thirds) of the 
property's appraised value.315 Many state legislatures also expanded 
the amount of personal property that was exempt from unsecured 
creditors' claims316 and enacted statutory periods during which mort- 
gagors and other debtors could redeem their property after creditors 
obtained judgments in a court of law. The Revised Statutes of the 
State of New York of 1829, for example, introduced a statutory period 
of redemption of fifteen months during which mortgagors could re- 
deem their property after a judgment at law.317 Notwithstanding these 
legal reforms, the Debt Recovery Act still had a profound impact dur- 
312 See William T. Vukowich, Debtors* Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. LJ. 779, 783 (1974). 
313 See, e.g., Act of June 16, 1807, 1807 N.H. Laws 19 (stating that "wearing apparel necessary 
for immediate use, one comfortable bed, bedstead and bedding necessary for the same, the bibles 
and school books in actual family use, together with one cow, and one swine, or in case the debtor 
be a mechanic, tools of his occupation to the value of twenty dollars in lieu of said Cow shall be 
altogether exempted from attachment and execution"). Colonial legislation typically exempted 
only "tools of the trade." 
314 WARREN, supra note 14, at 26-27. 
315 See id.; EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, NAVIGATING FAILURE 12 (2001). 
316 See BALLEISEN, supra note 315, at 12; see also 3-4 ANNUAL LAW REGISTER OF THE 
UNITED STATES (William Griffith ed., 1822) (listing state property exemptions). In response to 
the proliferation of educational institutions, many of the new state laws exempted "bibles and 
school books," "books of professional men," or "books of a student" from creditors' claims. See 
Morton J. Horwitz, Conceptualizing the Right of Access to Technology, 79 WASH. L. REV. 105, 113 
& n.37 (2004). 
317 4 KENT, supra note 14, at 427 ("[A]ll . . . redemptions must be within the fifteen months 
from the time of the sheriff's sale; for the sheriff is then to execute a deed to the person entitled, 
and the title so acquired becomes absolute in law." (citing 2 REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE 
OF NEW YORK 370-74 (Albany, Packard & Van BenThuysen 1829))). 
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ing this period. Indeed, James Kent's treatise of 1830 states that the 
policy of having no right of redemption, which he traces to the Debt 
Recovery Act, was still in force in New Jersey, Maryland, North Caro- 
lina, Tennessee, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippl.318 
Further reform occurred when the Panic of 1837 led to a wide- 
spread movement among state legislatures to go beyond former laws 
and to provide means by which homeowners could register and record 
their property as entirely exempt from the claims of creditors.319 In 
the 1 840s, almost every state enacted a law allowing married women 
to hold and register property in their own names - property that 
would be immune from the claims of their husbands' creditors.320 
Then, over the next few decades (and particularly in the 1850s), state 
legislatures immunized land from creditors' claims through homestead 
exemption laws based either on a minimum number of acres (typically 
ranging from 40 to 160 acres) or on a set monetary value of land.321 
States enacted laws providing for periods of time during which mort- 
gagors could redeem their property after foreclosure. These laws - a 
partial return to the family-based societal conception of early modern 
England - remain on the books today. 
Conclusion 
As this article has shown, for over a century, from 1732 to the 
1 85 os, American property law offered few protections from commercial 
risks. Joseph Story explained this legal development as "a natural re- 
sult of the condition of the people in a new country, who possessed lit- 
tle monied capital; whose wants were numerous; and whose desire of 
credit was correspondingly great."322 Story is likely correct that the 
economic conditions of the colonies, the lack of internal capital 
318 Id. at 426. 
319 See Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 
1400-04(1983). 
320 See id. at 1398-99 & nn. 207-09 (citing laws enacted in Mississippi in 1839; Maryland in 
1842 and 1843; Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Vermont in 1845; Connecticut in 
1845 and 1849; Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Ohio in 1846; Indiana 
in 1847; New York and Pennsylvania in 1848; Missouri and North Carolina in 1849; Tennessee 
and Wisconsin in 1850; and New Jersey in 1852). 
321 The homestead exemption laws typically required that homeowners preregister their prop- 
erty as exempt - by signing a certificate that was then attached to the title recorded by the 
county - prior to obtaining the benefits of the law. See Paul Goodman, The Emergence of 
Homestead Exemption in the United States: Accommodation and Resistance to the Market Revo- 
lution, 1840-1880, 80 J. AM. HIST. 470, 470-72 (1993); see also Alison D. Morantz, There's No 
Place Like Home: Homestead Exemption and Judicial Construction of Family in Nineteenth- 
Century America, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 245, 252-54 (2006) (describing by region the spread of 
homestead exemption laws); Vukowich, supra note 312, at 783 (discussing economic depressions 
and other factors as impetuses for homestead exemption laws in Southern and Western states). 
322 1 STORY, supra note 1, § 182. 
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sources, and the strong desire for credit might explain why colonial 
opposition to the Debt Recovery Act was not stronger. But Story's ex- 
planation does not capture the profound effects of the Debt Recovery 
Act on American economic, social, and political life. 
The most important effect was to diminish the role of landed in- 
heritance in American society by privileging the claims of creditors 
over heirs when debtors died. In England, land descended automati- 
cally to the heir free of the deceased's unsecured debts. In contrast, in 
America under the Debt Recovery Act regime, the inheritance of land 
occurred only when the deceased's debts were small enough to be sat- 
isfied out of the deceased's personal property. The profound impact of 
the Debt Recovery Act on inheritance is clearly expressed in writings 
assessing the Act after the American Revolution. One need look no 
further than D'Urphey v. Nelson, in which the judge referred to the 
Debt Recovery Act as an explanation for why "the extreme anxiety ob- 
servable in the common law of England to preserve the rights, and fa- 
vor the claims, of the heir at law, has been entirely dismissed from our 
law";323 or the lower court opinion in Waters, which described the ex- 
emption of land from debts as a result of the "solicitude of the holders 
of landed estates, to perpetuate them within families, combined with 
the genius of the English government," which was "local, . . . confined 
to Great Britain, and not . . . extending to its colonies";324 or Kent's 
opinion in Waters, which held that equitable rights of redemption did 
not survive execution sales, in part on the ground that such execution 
sales were "agreeable to the general bent and spirit of the more mod- 
ern decisions";325 or the Federalist congressman James Bayard, who 
described the exemption of land from creditors' claims as a "remnant 
of the feudal system, of the principle of the ancient aristocracy of Eng- 
land."326 These statements reveal that the transformation of creditors' 
remedies in relation to land and inheritance was an important compo- 
nent of founding-era debates over the legal preconditions of a republic. 
Historians have overlooked this feature of the founding-era revolu- 
tionary movement. This history demonstrates, however, that Ameri- 
can republicanism was the outgrowth of an earlier transformation to- 
ward a truly "colonial" law: a law developed in an imperial 
constitutional framework and suited to meet the ends of empire. Re- 
publicanism was not simply the product of an immediate explosion of 
hostility to English life. It was an expression of how far American so- 
cial and political life had diverged from that of the English. 
323 See supra p. 443. 
324 See supra p. 444. 
325 See supra p. 445. 
326 See supra p. 454. 
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This account also ties the dismantling of English inheritance law to 
slavery, an institution not normally viewed as supported strongly by 
republican values. In enacting the Debt Recovery Act, Parliament was 
centrally concerned with the laws of colonies that had relied on Eng- 
lish credit to import increasing numbers of slaves. The English ex- 
emptions of land from debt were most threatening to creditors when 
slaves were present: either when wealth held in the form of slaves 
might be converted into landed wealth or hidden from creditors, or 
when a colonial legislature might enact a law defining slaves as real 
property and therefore as exempt from creditors' claims. Parliament's 
Debt Recovery Act promoted the slave trade by explicitly repealing all 
colonial property exemptions to land, houses, and slaves and by requir- 
ing colonial courts to administer streamlined processes for seizing and 
selling these assets. In response to abolitionist protest, in 1797 Parlia- 
ment repealed the Debt Recovery Act with respect to slaves in all of 
the remaining British colonies.327 In America, however, the Debt Re- 
covery Act regime for slaves remained a fixture of the law. Indeed, af- 
ter the American Revolution, when republicanism was at its strongest, 
America was moving toward a regime of pure "chattel" slavery. 
Another important consequence of the Debt Recovery Act was to 
expand the commodification of land. Streamlining the procedures as- 
sociated with the sale of land by execution made it easier and less 
costly for both unsecured and secured creditors to seize land. The Act 
likely increased the instances in which debtors sold their land to settle 
with their creditors in advance of an execution sale. 
Finally, during the eighteenth century, the English exemptions of 
land from creditors' claims led, in England, to a categorical division 
between landholders, whose wealth was protected from immediate fi- 
nancial risks, and "merchants" and "traders" who became by definition 
people whose assets were subjected to greater financial risk. In 1732, 
Parliament introduced bankruptcy legislation that offered a fresh start 
to people legally defined as "traders," who were willing to give up their 
land to satisfy debts in the proceedings.328 In 1807, Parliament en- 
acted a more expansive statute stating that all land of persons defined 
as "traders" would be available to satisfy their unsecured debts both 
during life and at the time of death.329 In America, such categorical 
differences never emerged: American colonies had neither discrete 
classes of "merchants" and "traders," nor a discrete landed class. Dur- 
ing the colonial period, all forms of wealth were subjected to commer- 
327 See supra note 212. 
328 An Act To Prevent the Committing of Frauds by Bankrupts, 5 Geo. 2, c. 30 (1732). 
329 An Act for More Effectually Securing the Payment of the Debts of Traders, 47 Geo. 3, c. 74 
(1807). As mentioned, in 1833, Parliament repealed all protections to land from the claims of un- 
secured creditors as part of a broad reform of English property law. See supra p. 424. 
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cial risks. After the American Revolution, the vast differences in local 
preferences on the issue of creditors' remedies expressed themselves, 
not through occupational categorization, but instead through interstate 
variation and hostility toward federal government policies that might 
have imposed a uniform regime reminiscent of the Debt Recovery Act. 
Federalism emerged, in part, in response to hostility toward imperial 
policies. In sum, the colonial history of creditors' remedies had a last- 
ing legacy through its influence on American economic, social, and po- 
litical developments. 
